Legacies of British Colonial Violence: Viewing Kenyan Detention Camps through the Hanslope Disclosure by Duffy, A
Legacies of British Colonial Violence:
Viewing Kenyan Detention Camps through
the Hanslope Disclosure
AOIFE DUFFYQ1
A number of works have recently been published that seek to re-narrate co-
lonial histories, with a particular emphasis on the role of law in at once
creating and marginalizing colonial subjects.1 FocusingQ2 on mid-twentieth
century detention camps in the British colony of Kenya, this article illumi-
nates a colonial history that was deeply buried in a Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofﬁce (FCO) building for many years. As such, the anal-
ysis supports the revelatory work of David Anderson and Caroline Elkins,
who highlighted the violence that underpinned British detention and inter-
rogation practises in Kenya.2 In particular, the article explores recently
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declassiﬁed colonial ﬁles, and pieces together a picture of administrative
subterfuge, suppression of facts, and whitewashing atrocities, threaded
through with ofﬁcial denial, which long outlived its colonial genesis.
Against the hypothesis that detention laws created an architecture of de-
struction and concomitant custodial violence in Kenya, the article estab-
lishes that an accountability deﬁcit is the legacy of detention without
trial as it was practiced in colonial Kenya. By untangling a complex web
of colonial records and government papers relating to Kenya, this article
reveals the often insurmountable pressure that was exerted to conceal evi-
dence of detainee violence, and the role of a highly sophisticated propagan-
da machine that controlled the public narrative of a violent incident when
outright denial was impossible.
In an earlier Law and History Review forum, John Wertheimer argued
that the legacy of colonial legal racism persists today, and it is, therefore,
important to comprehend the “conceptual and material consequences” of
these laws.3 It is striking that several British colonies experienced insur-
gencies prior to independence,4 and, as a response, emergency laws and
ordinances were enacted that targeted indigenous peoples, and, more spe-
ciﬁcally, groups that would not demonstrate loyalty to the British Crown.
This was all too true in Kenya, where detention of enemy suspects in an
expansive network of camps,5 underpinned by laws passed by the governor
or approved by an unelected executive council, was part of the military
strategy designed to tackle the Mau Mau insurgency.6 At the center of
3. John Wertheimer, “Introduction,” Law and History Review 29 (2011): 469.
4. Which, of course, were not unique to British colonies, Rita Maran, Torture: The Role of
Ideology in the French-Algerian War (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989); and Marnia
Lazreg, Torture and the Twilight of Empire: From Algiers to Baghdad (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2008); see also A. W. Brian Simpson for other British end of
empire insurgencies, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of
the European Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); and John Newsinger,
British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2002).
5. Kenya, with a complex of more than 100 camps, had a greater number of detainees per
target population (Kikuyu) than any other British colony where detention without trial was
used, see David French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945–1967 (Oxford;
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 111.
6. For more on British responses to the Mau Mau insurgency, see Daniel Branch,
Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Huw Bennett, “The Mau Mau
Emergency as Part of the British Army’s Post-War Counter-Insurgency Experience,”
Defense & Security Analysis 23 (2007): 143–63; John Lonsdale, “Mau Maus of the
Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya,” The Journal of African History 31
(1990): 393–421; John Newsinger, “Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the
Mau Mau Rebellion,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 3 (1992): 47–57; and Thomas
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the Mau Mau rebellion was a struggle against a system of racial discrim-
ination that maintained white Europeans at the top of the hierarchy in
Kenya, with access to and ownership of the best lands, and control over
government and administrative structures, while many Kenyan tribes,
such as the Kikuyu, labored and toiled in substandard lands and plots of
ever decreasing size.7 During the Second World War, white settlers in
Kenya experienced an economic boom resulting from the market demands
for agricultural produce caused by shortages in Europe.8 When new crops
were introduced to the colony, accompanied by intensive farming methods
and increased mechanization, many African “squatters,” some of whom
had lived there for generations, were forced off European farms into home-
lessness and destitution in urban areas. Fabian Close elucidates on the mul-
tifactorial causes of African protest in Kenya, “the deterioration of African
living standards, the disappointment over unfulﬁlled expectations raised
during the war, the worsening of the squatter problem,” and, in particular,
frustration with increased colonial involvement in all facets of Kenyan
life.9 The deterioration in living conditions disproportionately affected
the Kikuyu,10 and in his book, The Kenya Question: An African Answer,
Tom Mboya described “the situation in his homeland as socially and polit-
ically unjust in light of the pressing problem of land distribution, open ra-
cial discrimination, and the total hegemony of Europeans.”11 Mboya, one
of only eight African members elected to the Legislative Council in 1957,
concluded that the development of the Mau Mau movement was a direct
“consequence of years of frustration and bitterness among the African
population.”12
Mockaitis, “Minimum Force, British Counter-Insurgency and the Mau Mau Rebellion: A
Reply,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 3 (1992): 87–89.
7. See, generally, John Overton, “The Origins of the Kikuyu Land Problem: Land
Alienation and Land Use in Kiambu, Kenya, 1895–1920,” African Studies Review 31
(1988): 109–26; and Frank Furedi, “The Social Composition of the Mau Mau Movement
in the White Highlands,” The Journal of Peasant Studies 1 (1974): 486–505.
8. For more on the powerful inﬂuence of the white settler in British politics, see Frank
Kitson, Bunch of Five (London: Faber, 1977), 6–7.
9. One of the most authoritative texts on this process is David Throup’s, Economic and
Social Origins of Mau Mau 1945–53 (London: Currey, 1987). See also Klose, Human
Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 65–66.
10. Bruce Berman, “Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: Colonial Administration and
the Origins of the ‘Mau Mau’ emergency in Kenya,” British Journal of Political Science
6 (1976): 143–75.
11. Tom Mboya, The Kenya Question: An African Answer (Q11 Fabian Colonial Bureau,
1956).
12. Mboya referenced in Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 197.
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Fiona Mackenzie’s work examines the agricultural crisis that developed
in the Kikuyu reserves as a result of overpopulation.13 The Kikuyu were
disaffected by evictions, forced labor, unemployment, and landlessness,
with consequent urban pressures, and these factors galvanized a rapidly
growing movement with an intricate “oathing” process at its core.14
Unlike their moderate counterparts, Mau Mau adherents promoted the
use of violence to eradicate British colonial rule.15 From the outset, the co-
lonial administration and metropolitan government portrayed the conﬂict in
Kenya as a “clash of progress and atavism, of good and evil,” rooted in the
“collective insanity” of the Kikuyu.16 However, Bruce Berman regards
Mau Mau violence as a response to the pre-emptive or “incumbent vio-
lence” of colonial authorities, thus illuminating the complicity of the
Kenyan administration in “shaping the origins and intensity of conﬂict.”17
To the network of prison and labor camps already in existence prior to the
emergency,18 Florence Bernault estimates that approximately ﬁfty deten-
tion camps were added.19 From 1953 to 1960, between 80,000 and
150,000 Mau Mau suspects were detained without trial in a variety of
camps; some pre-existing, others hastily built “temporary” structures,
and many characterized by poor living conditions.20 An elaborate detention
13. Fiona Mackenzie, Land, Ecology and Resistance in Kenya, 1880–1952 (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1998).
14. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 22–28. Frank Kitson also describes the signiﬁcance of
oathing among the Kikuyu tribe, and remarks that “[d]espite the fact that some Christian in-
ﬂuence had been disseminated in the half-century preceding the outbreak of the Emergency,
nearly all the Kikuyu believed in the power of oaths in the same way as mediaeval
Englishmen believe in witchcraft,” in Bunch of Five, 8.
15. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 68.
16. Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labour Question in
French and British Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 348, 351.
17. Bruce Berman, “Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence: Colonial Administration and
the Origins of the ‘Mau Mau’ Emergency in Kenya,” British Journal of Political Science
6 (1976): 143. Carl Rosberg and John Nottingham also point to the colonial administration’s
failure to introduce signiﬁcant reforms as a key contributing factor to the emergence of the
Mau Mau movement in The Myth of “Mau Mau”: Nationalism in Kenya (New York:
Praeger, 1966).
18. Daniel Branch describes the pre-emergency detention network of camps as a “carceral
archipelago,” see “Imprisonment and Colonialism in Kenya, C. 1930–1952: Escaping the
Carceral Archipelago,” International Journal of African Historical Studies 38 (2005): 256.
19. Florence Bernault, ed., A History of Prison and Conﬁnement in Africa (Portsmouth:
Heinemann, 2003), 13.
20. The ﬁgure of 80,000 detainees is propounded in the ofﬁcial record, whereas David
Anderson estimates that the maximum number who may have been detained to be
150,000 persons, Histories of the Hanged, 5. Anderson later clariﬁed this ﬁgure, by stating
that the actual numbers detained was probably between 100,000 and 110,000 (personal cor-
respondence with David Anderson). In Imperial Reckoning, Elkins claims that between
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system was created, infused with theories of Kikuyu psychopathology, un-
derpinned by psychologically rehabilitative measures to “cure” detainees of
their infected minds.21 The concept of rehabilitation through confession
permeated the system, and those who resisted this approach were variously
labelled “recalcitrant,” “irredeemable,” and “irreconcilable.” Camps were
put under the administration of the “Department of Community
Development and Rehabilitation,”22 and the system was conceptualized
as a “pipeline,” with “hardcore” Kikuyu who were labelled as “Z” or
“black” detained in remote high security encampments, eventually to be re-
labelled as “white,” and passed through the pipeline to open camps before
release and reintegration into society. To become “white” and successfully
exit the detention pipeline the detainee had to demonstrate an attitudinal
change: to confess taking the Mau Mau oath, to provide detail on the
crimes committed, and to further demonstrate that he or she was once
again a “useful citizen” through hard work and labor.23 Detainees were ex-
cluded from the public sphere and were prevented from contributing to de-
bate or commenting on conditions within the camps.24 Nevertheless,
occasionally information emerged that testiﬁed to a severe regime con-
trolled by European ofﬁcers and “loyalist” warders, who subjected detain-
ees to violence with impunity.25 Materials unearthed from the Hanslope
160,000 and 320,000 Kikuyu were detained during the emergency, but this assertion has
been called into question, see Guardian article by John Willis, “External Ombudsman’s de-
cision on David Elstein’s complaint,” April 7 2008 http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/
2008/apr/07/opendoor (April 18, 2015).
21. The National Archives (hereafter TNA)Q12 FCO 141/6321: Ofﬁce of the Commissioner
Kenya Prisons to the Secretary for Defence, May 31, 1956. See also, Pierce and Rao,
Discipline and the Other Body, 1.
22. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 351.
23. Ibid., and see TNA FCO 141/5666: Athi River Rehabilitation Camp, Moral
Rearmament Army, document circa August 1953.
24. Although detainees were allowed to send and receive one letter per month, the ofﬁcer
in charge of the detention camp could conﬁscate “any book or paper which, in his opinion,
contains any objectionable matter,” The Emergency (Detained Persons) Regulations 1954,
s 14(2).
25. Eileen Fletcher resigned her post in charge of female “rehabilitation” facilities in
Kenya after a mere 7 months, in protest over the conditions of detention, and she subse-
quently made statements to the press about what she had witnessed; see “Conditions in
Kenya Detention Camps,” The Times, June 7, 1956. Fletcher’s claims were denied by the
administration. The colonial secretary was deeply critical of Fletcher’s allegations, “I am
quite satisﬁed that Miss Fletcher’s charges are based in the main on hearsay, on partisan
opinion and personal prejudice. The negligible amount of criticism which could be levelled
has proved to be wholly disproportionate to the impression that she has contrived to create. I
would ask all fair-minded people to read carefully the documents in the Library of this
House and to make up their own minds,” see Hansard October 31, 1956, vol. 558, cc
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Disclosure,26 although corroborating the biographical narratives of former
detainees,27 have the power to redress the historical silencing by elucidat-
ing the contemporary colonial attitude to detainee protest.28
A claim for “alleged torts of assault and battery and negligence” was
submitted to the United Kingdom High Court by ﬁve elderly Kenyans
(Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce), in
which the complainants alleged that they had been tortured and mistreated
by “ofﬁcers and soldiers of the Kenya police force, the Home Guard and/or
the Kenya Regiment” while detained in British camps between 1954 and
1959.29 The injuries suffered by the former detainees resulted from “phys-
ical mistreatment of the most serious kind, including torture, rape, castra-
tion and severe beatings.”30 On the one hand, the British government
rejected the argument that it had “through the Colonial Ofﬁce and the
Army (under General George Erskine), played a material part in the crea-
tion and maintenance of a system for the suppression of the rebellion, in
part by means of torture and other mistreatment of detainees.”31 Onn the
other hand, however, the British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, accept-
ed the need for an examination of colonial era abuses. The case was fought
tenaciously by the British government, which resorted to detailed technical
1418–21. See also TNA CO 822/1236: Memoranda prepared by the Colonial Ofﬁce on re-
ports by Eileen Fletcher on detention and imprisonment of children in Kenya, 1957.
26. The “Hanslope Disclosure,” refers to the discovery in 2011 of more than 8,000 ﬁles
pertaining to thirty-seven former colonies at a Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce building
in Hanslope Park, Milton Keynes. Between April 2012 and November 2013, the majority of
these ﬁles were released to the National Archives, Kew Gardens. Within the National
Archives, the FCO 141 series is generally referred to as the “migrated archives.”
27. Marshall S. Clough ed., Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory and Politics (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Gakaara wa Wanjaii, Mau Mau Author in Detention
(Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya, 1988); Wambui Waiyaki Otieno, Mau Mau Daughter: A
Life History (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); and Josiah Mwangi Kariuki,
“Mau Mau” Detainee: The Account by a Kenya African of His Experiences in Detention
Camps, 1953–1960 (Transafrica Press, 2009).
28. For example, see the government’s response to Victor Shuter’s exposition of the bru-
tality he witnessed in the Kenyan “rehabilitation” camps in Elkins, Imperial Reckoning,
340–44. Also, Huw Bennett notes that one settler (Denning) complained about screening
teams beating up his employees. The authorities dismissed Denning’s allegations, accusing
him of being a man with “a rather unsavoury past,” Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau,Q13 37.
29. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011] EWHC
Q14 1913 (QB), July 21, 2011, para. 1; and Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2012] EWHC 2678 (QB), November 5, 2012.
30. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 1.
31. For more on the mechanisms involved in governmental denial of human rights abuses
and atrocities see Stanley Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suffering
(Cambridge: Polity, 2001).
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arguments at an early stage of proceedings; a position described by Justice
McCombeQ3 as “dishonourable,” given the serious nature of torture.32
Therefore, the unexpected announcement by the foreign secretary in
June 2013 that a settlement of £19,900,000 would be granted to 5,228
Kenyan camp survivors appears to have been a complete reversal of the
government’s position.33 It must be borne in mind that the settlement
came after the British government had experienced a number of setbacks
in court, and evidence of systematic and widespread abuses in detention
was mounting as historians analyzed declassiﬁed ﬁles (the “Hanslope
Disclosure”) and other sources.34 Hague stressed, however, that the gov-
ernment was not accepting legal liability in the case, and he attempted to
shut the door on prospective claims from other former colonies “[w]e con-
tinue to deny liability on behalf of the Government and British taxpayers
today for the actions of the colonial administration in respect of the claims,
and indeed the courts have made no ﬁnding of liability against the
Government in this case. We do not believe that claims relating to events
that occurred overseas outside direct British jurisdiction more than ﬁfty
years ago can be resolved satisfactorily through the courts without the tes-
timony of key witnesses that is no longer available.”35 Aside from pointing
out that the settlement was not precedent setting, Hague also vigorously
defended the government’s right to ﬁght such claims.36
Pressure to locate missing colonial ﬁles stemmed directly from the Ndiku
Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth OfﬁceQ4 case. Historians,
such as David Anderson, were aware that hundreds of valuable ﬁles had been
transferred from Kenya to the United Kingdom prior to Kenyan independence
in 1963. An inquiry was submitted to the relevant section of the FCO regard-
ing these missing ﬁles, but it was unsuccessful. Finally, on foot ofQ5 a second
request, in January 2011 an ofﬁcial within “the defendant’s organisation re-
ceived a telephone call from IMG [Information Management Group] indicat-
ing that what appeared to be the missing 300 boxes had been found. The
defendant then set in train a process of analyzing the new papers and disclos-
ing those that they perceived to be relevant to the claimants.”37 Upon
32. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 154.
33. “Statement to Parliament on settlement of Mau Mau claims,” Foreign Secretary
William Hague, June 6, 2013, full text of speech available at https://www.gov.uk/govern
ment/news/statement-to-parliament-on-settlement-of-mau-mau-claims (April 18, 2015).
34. Caroline Elkins, “Britain has said sorry to the Mau Mau. The rest of the empire is still
waiting,” The Guardian, June 7, 2013 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
jun/06/britain-maumau-empire-waiting (April 18, 2015).
35. Hague, “Statement to Parliament on settlement of Mau Mau claims.”
36. Ibid.
37. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 32.
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examination, the “Hanslope Disclosure” (also referred to as the “migrated ar-
chives” within the British National Archives system), revealed the existence
of 8,500 ﬁles pertaining to thirty-seven former colonies at a FCO building in
Hanslope Park, Milton Keynes. The majority of these ﬁles have been released
to the National Archives, Kew Gardens.
Considering Nazi concentration camps, Giorgio Agamben, rather than
questioning “how crimes of such atrocity could be committed against
human beings,” regards it as more honest and useful “to investigate care-
fully the juridical procedures and deployments of power by which human
beings could be so completely deprived of their rights and prerogatives that
no acts committed against them could appear [. . .] as a crime.”38 This ques-
tion is relevant to a retrospective inquiry into Kenyan detention camp abus-
es. The crux of the matter is this: British politicians and colonial ofﬁcials
readily abandoned fundamental legal principles when the abrogation
affected an “undesirable other.” Amnesties, such as the one applied to
Kenya, which pardoned all violence that had occurred prior to January
18, 1955, and ex post facto regulations, which legalized foregoing criminal
acts,39 effectively gave the accountability deﬁcit a façade of legality. The
“self-preserving violence” of the state was shielded by impunity in govern-
ment, which was also fostered by the judiciary, even where evidence exist-
ed that ill-treatment, torture, and unlawful killings had occurred in British
custody.40
This entire system would have collapsed under the weight of normal in-
vestigatory standards and accountability; therefore, impunity upheld the re-
stricted liberty conditions throughout the “emergency” and perpetuated a
culture of violence. In framing the terms of decolonization, the British gov-
ernment also deﬁned the historical narrative of the Mau Mau insurgency
and the counterinsurgency. This discourse portrayed state violence as nec-
essary and the British colonials as rational and legitimate actors. To no
small extent, this was a reaction to the postwar atmosphere which support-
ed anticolonial struggles and self-determination,41 sponsored by the United
38. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1998), 171
39. For example, the British colonial administration passed Regulation 27A in Malaya after
the Batang Kali massacre in December 1948; see Mark Townsend, “Revealed: how Britain tried
to legitimise Batang Kali massacre,” The Guardian, May 6, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/may/06/britain-batang-kali-massacre-malaysia (April 18, 2015).
40. See, for example, Elizabeth Kolsky’s study of white violence in colonial India:
Colonial Justice in British India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
41. Klose, Human Rights in Shadow of Colonial Violence, 199. See also Burke,
Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 39.
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States and enshrined in the United Nations Charter.42 Frederick Cooper
identiﬁes tensions that arose between American and British policy makers
attempting to agree on a self-governing framework for African states.43
The Colonial Ofﬁce was forced to present a “progressive colonial policy,”
promulgated in the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, which purport-
edly aimed to raise socioeconomic and labor standards of indigenous peo-
ples preparing for self-government.44 Cooper argues that it did nothing of
the sort, and highlights the colonial secretary’s rationalization for maintain-
ing the colonial status quo, “I am not basing my argument on material
gains to ourselves, important as I think these may be. My feeling is that
in these years to come without the Commonwealth and Empire, this coun-
try will play a small role in world affairs, and that here we have an oppor-
tunity which may never recur, at a cost which is not extravagant, of setting
the Colonial Empire on lines of development which will keep it in close
and loyal contact with us.”45 Moreover, the colonies had proven beneﬁcial
during the war, and the economic signiﬁcance of these acquisitions extend-
ed as certain promises made to British consumers were to be redeemed
after the war.46 Another factor that may have conversely pushed colonial
era abuses underground is that the British government was heavily in-
volved in drafting the European Convention on Human Rights, with
Winston Churchill maintaining that the Strasbourg institutions “would
exist to draw attention to violations of human rights through a ruling
that represented a ‘judgment of the civilized world’.”47 The British jurist,
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, is considered a founding father of the European
Convention.48 In order to reconcile the dissonance between European
Convention ideals and the actual situation in many colonies, the colonial
administration had to hide evidence of abuses, and this created a culture
of denial that has contemporary resonance. Consequently, a massive propa-
ganda campaign was launched against Mau Mau, “one of the most inten-
sive propaganda attacks on an African national movement,” that sought to
delegitimize the movement, while at the same time withholding details of
42. Following the United States Charter, a United Nations commission was tasked with
drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which came into being in 1948.
43. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 112.
44. Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1940.
45. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 120, Cooper references TNA PREMQ15 4/
43A/8: WP (44)643.
46. Ibid., 123.
47. Winston Churchill quoted in Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on
Human Rights: From its Inception to the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 7.
48. Ibid., 61.
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colonial and administrative violence from public scrutiny.49 Fabian Klose
describes the development of an “effective information machine” in Kenya,
which underpinned military endeavors. He elucidates a two pronged
British propaganda strategy, with the internal element directed toward ma-
nipulating public opinion within the colony, whereas the external strand,
managed by the Kenya Government Press Ofﬁce, “ﬁltered information
on the situation in the crown colony to the national and international
media.”50 An additional public relations hub was established in London,
the Kenya Government Public Relations Ofﬁce, which was “chieﬂy re-
sponsible for the international public image of the Kenya question.”51
This concern with appearance and concealing security force violence
continued during decolonization, and within the Hanslope ﬁles it is possi-
ble to pinpoint signiﬁcant directives issued by the Colonial Ofﬁce in the
late 1950s that were central to the framework of ofﬁcial denial and amnesia
regarding the colonies. As British colonial territories were inching toward
independence in the mid-twentieth century, the British government redou-
bled its efforts to bury any evidence that implicated its colonial ofﬁcials in
violations that occurred in territories under British administration.52 On the
whole, there were two main sources of concern: international political dis-
approbation, and the consequence of litigation arising from a former colo-
ny. As a result, all top-secret classiﬁed materials were rapidly centralized in
executive ofﬁces and marked for “European eyes only” prior to Kenyan in-
dependence, and the ﬁles were then either destroyed or removed to the
United Kingdom in the 1960s.53 It was intended that evidence of serious
human rights abuses would be destroyed in these document purges. On
December 9, 1959, a secret dispatch was sent from the Colonial Ofﬁce
in London to various colonial administrations regarding the “security of
documents.”54 In essence, the circular granted authority to the governor
to destroy any top secret or “accountable” material prior to the transfer
of sovereignty to the independent territory. In addition, governors were
obliged to destroy “any Top-Secret or Accountable document if requested
49. Wunyabari Maloba quoted in Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial
Violence, 199.
50. Ibid., 200.
51. Ibid.
52. Ian Cobain, Owen Bowcott, and Richard Norton-Taylor, “Britain destroyed records of
colonial crimes,” The Guardian, April 18, 2012 http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/apr/18/
britain-destroyed-records-colonial-crimes (April 18, 2015).
53. Ibid.
54. These administrations were Tanganyika, Singapore, Leeward and Windward Islands,
and the East African High Commission, see TNA FCO 141/6957: Despatch signed by Lord
Q3 Perth on behalf of the Colonial Secretary, December 9, 1959.
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to do so by the Secretary of State.”55 To audit the process, the Colonial
Ofﬁce required the submission of annual returns regarding which “account-
able” documents had been destroyed, and a list specifying “accountable”
documents that remained in the colony. A “Destruction Certiﬁcate” was
submitted to the colonial secretary when materials were destroyed, whereas
a “Handing Over Certiﬁcate” was submitted for any documents transferred
to a newly independent government.56
There were various permutations across the colonies in how the directive
was applied and in Uganda, a memo entitled “Operation Legacy” was cir-
culated in February 1961, with the instruction that ofﬁcial papers should be
withdrawn (“either be destroyed or passed to a higher ofﬁce”) and made
inaccessible to “unofﬁcial” or “unauthorised ofﬁcers.”57 Materials destined
for this treatment were to be “known as ‘DG’ [Deputy Governor] pa-
pers.”58 It was imperative that the following ﬁles be included in the series:
“any papers which might be interpreted as showing religious intolerance on
the part of H.M.G., the present Uganda Government or friendly countries,”
and “all papers which might be interpreted as showing racial discrimination
against Africans (or Negroes in the USA) on the part of H.M.G., the pre-
sent Uganda Government or friendly countries.”59
In Kenya, sensitive materials were categorized as belonging to the
“Watch” series, but for purposes similar to the “DG” categorization in
Uganda. Overall, the “Watch” catalogue incorporated papers “which
must only be seen by ‘authorised’ ofﬁcers. . . And which will ultimately
have either to be destroyed or to be removed to the United Kingdom.”60
Alternatively, documents could have been ﬁled under the “Legacy” series,
namely, “all those other papers which may safely and appropriately be seen
in the course of duty by persons who may not ﬁt the deﬁnition of ‘autho-
rised’ ofﬁcers, and which will eventually be inherited by an independent
Government.”61 In the event, an “authorised” ofﬁcer entitled to handle
“Watch” materials was “a servant of the Kenya government who is a
British subject of European descent.”62 Underpinning this administrative
55. TNA FCO 141/6957: Circular 1282/59, “Security of Documents,” December 9, 1959,
from Lord Perth on behalf of the secretary of state, para. vi.
56. Ibid., paras. ii, iii, vi.
57. TNA FCO 141/6957: Circular memorandum, “Operation Legacy,” February 28, 1961,
para. 3.
58. Ibid., para. 4.
59. TNA FCO 141/6957: Appendix to circular memorandum, “Operation Legacy,”
February 28, 1961, para. 1.
60. TNA FCO 141/6957: Undated draft entitled “The Designation Watch.”
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid., para. 9.
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directive was the assumption that the new classiﬁcation would exclude
black Africans; therefore, it enabled “social exclusion without slippage
into transparently racist language.”63 Reiterating the nomenclature of the
Uganda circular (which was widely disseminated in Kenya), a Special
Branch directive outlined that “[a]ll papers which might be interpreted as
showing racial discrimination against Africans on the part of
Government” must be included in the “Watch” series.64 Against thisQ6 , it
was essential that the existence of the series be concealed, and to minimize
the risk of exposure, a Kenyan Ministry of Defence ofﬁcial advocated a re-
stricted distribution list to provincial commissioners, permanent secretaries,
and a small number of heads of departments.65
As the pace of localization quickened, the destruction and removal of
“Watch” material continued apace. An illustration of potentially inculpato-
ry documentation included the “personal secret and conﬁdential ﬁles” of
approximately 1000 “ofﬁcers, particularly those of certain district ofﬁcers,
police ofﬁcers, prison ofﬁcers, ex-ﬁeld intelligence ofﬁcers,” replete with
information “which in the interests of those ofﬁcers should not be retained
in the Government Registries after independence.”66 It is notable that some
“Watch” materials survived the end of empire document cull and are in-
cluded in the Hanslope Disclosure.67 On the whole, the surviving
Hanslope materials have been released to the National Archives, with
some redactions.68 The new information documented in this article may
well be comprehended againstQ7 the inscription of Kenyan peoples as sub-
jects of British colonial law, and the constitutional arrangements in
which an emergency detention regime would ﬂourish without meaningful
oversight mechanisms.
63. Christopher Lee, “Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis in the Colonies: The Interwar Politics of
Race, Culture, and Multiracial Legal Status in British Africa,” Law and History Review 29
(2011): 507.
64. TNA FCO 141/6957: Measures for the Protection of Special Documents: Protection of
Special Branch Material, use of the marking “Watch.”
65. TNA FCO 141/6957: minute by Geoffrey Ellerton attached to Designation Watch
Circular, para. 22.
66. TNA FCO 141/6957: letter from the Governor of Kenya to the colonial secretary with
subject line “Security of Personal Records of Ofﬁcers,” September 21, 1961.
67. These documents may have been retained because of their historical importance, but a
more likely explanation is that there was a lack of the requisite person-power needed to
destroy such volumes of material in a relatively short time frame, see TNA FCO 141/
6957–6959: these ﬁles contain numerous Watch documents all bearing the “W” stamp.
68. There may be further clues as to exactly which materials were destroyed. For example,
the Colonial Ofﬁce should have registries for the “Watch” series, copies of annual reports
from each colony on “accountable” documents, and destruction certiﬁcates from various
governors detailing the documents they had destroyed.
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The Birth of Sovereignty: Kenya
The British government formally assumed administration of the
Protectorate of East Africa in 1895, a territory covering modern day
Kenya and Uganda.69 Under the Protectorate, a dual system of law was es-
tablished, whereby customary laws and native courts were preserved to ar-
bitrate certain matters, whereas an English common law-styled legal
system, which eventually drew from Indian penal and criminal codes,
worked alongside the customary system.70 In general, native sovereignty
over legal issues was granted if not in conﬂict with European interests,
but “in cases where vital issues were at stake, European states simply as-
sumed sovereignty over the issues.”71 The vital issues in Kenya were
land and political representation. All political and policy decisions, both
at the regional and international levels, occurred to the exclusion of the
African population, who were most adversely affected by them. The East
Africa Order in Council of 1902 was a legal instrument that derived its
power from the royal prerogative. British jurisdiction was extended to
the territory by virtue of the 1902 Order, which established the ofﬁce of
a Commissioner “empowered to make Ordinances for the administration
of justice, the raising of revenue and generally for the peace, order and
good government of all persons in the Protectorate.”72 Local lawmaking
powers were centered in this ofﬁce until 1906, when the Legislative
Council was created. It was not until 1944 that the ﬁrst African was elected
to the Legislative Council,73 long after the most fertile highlands had been
alienated to European settlers.74
69. The British government took over from the Imperial British East Africa Company,
because it was unable to fulﬁl its charter obligations as a result of ﬁnancial difﬁculties,
see C. W.Q3 Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Company to Crown Colony (London: Frank
Cass Publishers, 1929), 124.
70. Sandra Fullerton Joireman, “The Evolution of the Common Law: Legal Development
in Kenya and India,” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 44 (2006): 190–210, see also
Brett Shadle, “‘Changing Traditions to Meet Altering Conditions’: Customary Law, African
Courts and the Rejection of Codiﬁcation in Kenya, 1930–60,” The Journal of African
History 40 (1999): 411–31.
71. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty,Q13 105.
72. Henry Morris, Government Publications relating to Kenya (including the East Africa
High Commission and the East African Common Services Organisation) 1897–1963
(London: School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London, 1976), see http://
www.microform.co.uk/guides/R96995.pdf (April 18, 2015).
73. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 29.
74. Berman, “Bureacracy and Incumbent Violence,” 145, 153.
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British Settlement Act 1887
In 1920, the East African Protectorate was annexed by the Kenya
(Annexation) Order in Council (June 11, 1920), under Section 2 of the
British Settlement Act 1887,75 to create the colony of Kenya.76 The
British Settlement Act further enabled the Crown by Letters Patent or a
similar instrument “to delegate to any three or more persons within the set-
tlement” the powers conferred by Parliament.77 A Letters Patent (1920)
ﬂeshed out details of the new colony’s governmental institutions.78
Article 1 set out the Ofﬁce of the Governor General, whereas Article 3 con-
ferred powers on the Governor General’s Ofﬁce, provided these were not
repugnant to other provisions of the Letters Patent. Lawmaking powers
passed to the Legislative Council; provisions and regulations were to cor-
respond to the laws of England and local lawmaking powers were delegat-
ed such as were “necessary for the peace, order, and good government of
the Colony.”79 The governor had the power to veto legislation drafted
by the Legislative Council, and a subsequent document afﬁrmed the status
of the governor as the “single and supreme authority responsible to, and
representative of, Her Majesty,” and, therefore, entitled to the aid and as-
sistance of military and civilian servants within the Colony.80 It was
through this ofﬁce that emergency powers, such as executive detention
and warrantless arrest, were realized.
Emergency Laws and Detention Ordinances
Following an upsurge in violence against settler farmers and the assassina-
tion of the Paramount Chief for Central Province, Chief Waruhiu, on
October 7, 1952,81 the Governor of Kenya, Sir Evelyn Baring, declared
75. Section 2 outlines that “[i]t shall be lawful for her Majesty the Queen in Council from
time to time to establish any such laws and institutions, and constitute such courts and of-
ﬁces, make provisions and regulations for the proceedings in the said courts and for the ad-
ministration of justice, as shall appear to Her Majesty to be necessary for the peace, order
and good government of Her Majesty’s subjects and others within any British settlement,”
The British Settlement Act 1887, s. 2.
76. The Kenya (Annexation) Order June 11, 1920.
77. Roberts–Wray, “Commonwealth and Colonial Law,”Q13 168.
78. Letters Patent of September 11, 1920. The 1920 Letters Patent were “repealed by the
Kenya Constitution Order 1958, Section 1(3) and the First Schedule. However, Section 3 of
the 1958 Constitution re-produced a statement of the powers and duties of the governor in
closely similar terms to Article 3 of the old instrument,” see Ndiku Mutua and Others v The
Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 23.
79. Letters Patent of September 11, 1920, s. 10
80. Directions for a General Guidance to Colonial Governors, Colonial Regulations, 1956.
81. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 70.
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a state of emergency in the territory on October 20, 1952, which lasted
until January 12, 1960.82 It is notable that the wartime Emergency
Powers Order-in-Council 1939 was invoked,83 which provided the gover-
nor with complete discretion to introduce any regulation he thought “nec-
essary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the
territory, the maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny,
rebellion and riot, and for maintaining supplies and services essential
to the life of the community.”84 Notwithstanding these general powers,
6(2)(a) of the order speciﬁed that the regulations could “make provision
for the detention of persons and the deportation and exclusion of persons
from the territory.”85 It was on this authority that the governor passed a
number of detention ordinances during the 1950s, providing the legal
basis for the incarceration of Mau Mau suspects without trial.86
According to a Colonial Ofﬁce memorandum, “the Governor may make
a detention order against any person over whom he is satisﬁed that it is nec-
essary to exercise control for the purpose of maintaining public order.”87
82. Political authorisation for the proclamation had been given by resolution of the United
Kingdom Cabinet of October 14, 1952, see Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 8. Proclamation reads as follows: “IN EXERCISE of
the powers conferred on me by section 3 of the Emergency Powers Order in Council,
1939, and of all other powers enabling me in that behalf, I DO by this Proclamation
bring into operation the provisions of Part II of the said Order in Council with effect
from the date of this Proclamation,” The Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939,
Proclamation No. 38 of 1952.
83. “His Majesty, by virtue and in exercise of the powers vested in Him by the British
Settlements Act, 1887, the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890, and of all other powers enabling
Him in his behalf, is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to order, and it is
hereby ordered, as follows: 3. The provisions of Part II of this Order shall have effect in any
territory in which they shall from time to time, in case of any public Emergency, be brought
into operation by Proclamation made by the Governor, and shall continue in operation until a
further Proclamation directing that they shall cease to have effect is made by the Governor,
and shall then cease to have effect except as respects things previously done or omitted to be
done.” The Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, part I, s. 3.
84. The Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, March 9, 1939, Part II – Regulations,
s. 6(1).
85. Ibid., s. 6(2)(a).
86. The governor passed the ﬁrst emergency regulation pertaining to detention in 1952
drawing from powers contained in Section 3, part 2, 6 (2) (a) of the Emergency Powers
Order-in-Council, 1939, which conferred upon the governor of Kenya powers to detain in-
dividuals in an emergency context. The 1939 Order-in-Council was replaced by the
Emergency Powers (Amendment) Order-in-Council 1952 to deal with the exigencies of
the colonial situation, see TNA CO 822/725. Detention ordinances included: Emergency
Regulations 1952, Detention Orders and Power to Detain Suspected Persons; The
Emergency (Detained Persons) Regulations 1954; The Emergency (Detention Camps)
Regulations 1959.
87. TNA CO 822/725: Note on detainees in Kenya, Colonial Ofﬁce.
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Detention without trial became a cornerstone of counterinsurgency opera-
tions in Kenya and enemy suspects were held in facilities ranging from
detention camps to Home Guard stations, screening centers, transit
camps, and makeshift units on white settler farms.88
As it turns out, detention regulations were ratiﬁed on the same day that
the emergency was proclaimed. Section 2(1) of the Emergency Regulations
1952 read “[w]henever the Governor is satisﬁed that, for the purpose of
maintaining public order, it is necessary to exercise control over any per-
son, the Governor may make an order (hereinafter called a detention
order) against any such person directing that he be detained, and thereupon
such person shall be arrested and detained.”89 Operation Jock Scott was
launched in Nairobi the following day, during which 180 alleged Mau
Mau leaders were arrested, including the moderate politician, Jomo
Kenyatta, who was a central ﬁgure in the Kenya African Union.90
Kenyatta disavowed Mau Mau violence, but was sentenced to 7 years’ im-
prisonment, after what was considered a highly politicized trial and he
“thus became a martyr of the movement.”91 Operation Anvil, launched
on April 16, 1954,92 gave rise to a new wave of arrests, and by
December 1954, 71,346 Mau Mau suspects were being detained in
camps across Kenya.93 In Kenya and in Britain, the detention camps
were promoted as places of rehabilitation, so as to relieve the Kikuyu of
88. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 5.
89. Emergency Regulations 1952, s. 2(1).
90. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 70.
91. Ibid. See also Montago Slater, The Trial of Jomo Kenyatta (London: Secker &
Warburg, 1955). Although the administration went through the motions of a trial process
for Kenyatta, he and many others were to languish in appalling camp conditions for the dura-
tion of the emergency. See John Lonsdale, “Kenyatta’s trials: breaking and making an
African nationalist,” in The Moral World of the Law, ed. Peter Coss (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 196–239. Kenyatta went on to become Kenya’s ﬁrst
president at independence; see also, Jomo Kenyatta, Suffering without Bitterness. The
Founding of the Kenya Nation (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968); and Jomo
Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya: The Traditional Life of the Gikuyu (London: Heinemann,
1979).
92. Caroline Elkins observes that 16,500 were detained in Nairobi during Operation
Anvil, Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para.
42. Cooper points out that during Operation Anvil all Kikuyu inhabitants living in
Nairobi were detained, purely on the basis of ethnicity, and that this led to a labor shortage
in the city, see Decolonization and African Society, 355. However, Klose maintains that half
of Kikuyu inhabitants in Nairobi were detained following Operation Anvil, whereas the
other half (mainly women and children) were returned to the (already overpopulated) reser-
vations, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 75.
93. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 313.
Law and History Review, Month 201516
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
their Mau Mau “psychopathology.”94 Essentially, however, the camps
were sites of intelligence gathering underpinned by abusive methods,
sites of cheap or free labor, and locations where sovereign power atomized
communities, families, and villages in the production of dehumanized in-
dividuals or to borrow Giorgio Agamben’s phrase, homo sacer, an allegor-
ical ﬁgure from Roman history who could be killed without the
commission of homicide.95 Emergency codes and ordinances merely
gave the violent architecture a façade of legality.
In her study on the history of conﬁnement in Africa, Bernault argues that
the colonial penitentiary merely supplemented the “public violence” en-
demic to African colonial societies.96 Corporal punishment as a penal sanc-
tion was abolished in England and Wales in 1948, and shortly afterwards,
the Colonial Secretary, James Grifﬁths, announced that the colonies should
follow suit.97 However, “in the 1950s, sentences of corporal punishment
increased in [. . .] Kenya.”98 A detailed punishment regime prescribed by
detention regulations was applied within the Kenyan camps. Minor offens-
es were punishable by one or more of the following: solitary conﬁnement
and reduced diet, removal of privileges, and reprimand.99 A similar punish-
ment regime could be invoked for major offenses, such as mutiny, assault
on a prison worker, or aggravated assault on another detainee, and these
could also attract corporal punishment. Regulation 17 of the Emergency
(Detained Persons) Regulations 1954 stipulated that corporal punishment
should not exceed twelve strokes and that the ofﬁcer-in-charge of the
camp was to be present while the punishment was being executed.100 In
their edited volume, Discipline and the Other Body, Anupama Rao and
Steven Pierce argue that colonial “corporeal violence,” such as ﬂogging,
bodily violence and torture, was applied to individuals or “bodies” increas-
ingly deemed irrational, even as they “simultaneously emerged as [. . .]
94. Pierce and Rao, Discipline and the Other Body, 1. The Kenyan administration com-
missioned Dr. John Carothers to write a report, one of the sole surviving examples of gov-
ernment sponsored “ethno-psychiatry,” purportedly to help understand the causes of the Mau
Mau rebellion; see John Carothers, The Psychology of Mau Mau (Nairobi: Government
Press, 1954); see also TNA FCO 141/5666: Athi River Rehabilitation Camp –undated mem-
orandum circa August 1953.
95. See Agamben, Homo Sacer. See also Aoife Duffy, “Detainee as “Exile”: Theorizing
the Politico-Legal Underpinnings of Executive Detention,” Interdisciplinary Journal of
Human Rights Law 7 (2012–2013): 1–17.
96. Bernault, A History of Prison and Conﬁnement in Africa, 3.
97. Ibid., 109.
98. Ibid., 109–10.
99. Minor offences included, inter alia, spitting, malingering, refusing to eat, and making
excessive noise, the Emergency (Detained Persons) Regulations 1954, s. 17.
100. Ibid., s. 17(a).
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targets of humanitarian reform.”101 This pattern was evident during the
Kenyan Emergency, whereby the use of corporal punishment proliferated
with the introduction of Mau Mau detainees into what Daniel Branch
terms the “carceral archipelago;”102 however, it was conversely under-
pinned by Christian concern for these damaged subjects. In particular, an
experiment was launched at Athi River Rehabilitation Camp by the
Moral Rearmament Army (MRA), which offered “Christian and democrat-
ic alternatives” to the Mau Mau “disease of the mind,” with the promise of
curing “thousands of KEM [Kikuyu] now infected” and demolishing “their
present faith” to substitute it with “a superior one.”103
Substantively, there were two means through which detainees could
challenge the basis of detention. First, every detainee had the right to
make a representation in writing to the governor in respect of his or her
detention order.104 As the population was largely illiterate, this made ac-
cess to justice difﬁcult, and it is unclear from the surviving records how
many detention orders were revoked as a result of these petitions. A
three person “Advisory Committee on Detainees” chaired by Justice C.PQ3 .
Connell was established in 1953 to review detainee appeals.105 It was
the chairman’s duty to “inform the objector of the grounds on which the
order [had] been made against him and to furnish him with such particulars
as are, in the opinion of the chairman, sufﬁcient to enable him to present
his case.”106 Detainees were not entitled to legal representation before
the Committee, and only received a summary of the charges in advance,
with more detail being provided during the oral hearing. As such, the
Advisory Committee was not a judicial fact-ﬁnding body, but had a man-
date to assess the risk that a detainee posed to public security if released.
Caroline Elkins maintains that fewer than 250 appellants secured their free-
dom through this procedure, but a letter dated January 4, 1960 from the
Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod to Dingle Foot, MP outlines the number
of appeals made to the Advisory Committee during the emergency and
out of 2,604 submissions, 1,088 were successful, representing a 41%
101. Pierce and Rao, Discipline and the Other Body, 6.
102. Corporal punishment constituted 17% of penalties for personal violence offenses in
1938, but this rose to 61% by 1951; see Daniel Branch, “Imprisonment and Colonialism in
Kenya, C. 1930–1952: Escaping the Carceral Archipelago,” International Journal of African
Historical Studies 38 (2005): 256.
103. TNA FCO 141/5670: Working Party on Future of Athi River Detention Camp, May
11, 1955, various government ministers were in attendance.
104. Emergency Regulations, 1952, s. 2(3)(b).
105. Ibid., s. 2(3)(c).
106. TNA CO 822/1234: letter from Dingle Foot to John Profumo, November 25, 1957.
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success rate.107 Detainees were not immediately released following the
Advisory Committee’s recommendations, but passed up through the “pipe-
line” to “open camps” for eventual reintegration into the community.108
Although the recommendations were not binding upon the governor, in a
letter to the secretary of state for the colonies, Governor Baring asserted
that he had never overruled a decision made by the Committee.109
Violence in the Detention Archipelago
The emergency was a time of violent upheaval in certain regions of Kenya,
notably in the Rift Valley and Central Provinces, and none were more af-
fected by violence than the Kikuyu population, who were, in general,
deemed untrustworthy by the administration and as potential Mau Mau ac-
complices.110 The Kikuyu experienced “undesirable atrocities and tortures”
in their contact with the security forces and the Kenya Regiment.111
Composed of several battalions, the territorial Kenya Regiment was staffed
by British army ofﬁcers, whereas the rank and ﬁle were mainly European
settlers. It adhered to the normal army chain of command. By March 1953,
Home Guards units composed of loyalist Kikuyu, Meru, and Embu had
been formed.112 Huw Bennett submits that the role of the Home Guard
evolved over time, and whereas initially they were charged with protecting
village chiefs and headmen, in 1953, “units began to patrol large areas and
ﬁght in combat.”113 Home Guard posts were fortiﬁed buildings located in
the new villages,114 which became increasingly implicated in violence as
107. TNA CO 822/1234: letter from Ian Macloed, Colonial Secretary, to Dingle Foot,
January 4,1960.
108. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 111, 120, 237.
109. TNA CO 822/1234: letter from Governor Baring to the secretary of state for the col-
onies, June 24, 1958.
110. Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau, 8.
111. TNA FCO 141/5667: A petition from more than 1,000 detainees, Athi River
Internment Camp to all party Parliamentary delegation, c/o Government House, Nairobi,
January 20, 1954.
112. The Embu and Meru people were closely linked to the Kikuyu tribe and also targeted
by emergency regulations.
113. Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau, 16.
114. Villagization was a counterinsurgency strategy adopted in Malaya, and transposed to
the Kikuyu reserves, where it was portrayed as a security measure designed to protect the
Kikuyu population from Mau Mau “infection;” see Carothers, “The Psychology of Mau
Mau,” 20. See also TNA FCO 141/5666 for a detailed report on detention and rehabilitation
in Malaya, compiled by the Community Development Organisation following a visit to
Malaya, with recommendations for Kenya, August 27, 1953. The creation of these new vil-
lages was “an unprecedented opportunity for the introduction of liberal reform and British
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the emergency unfolded.115 By 1955, approximately 800 Kikuyu “new vil-
lages” had been established through the forcible relocation of more than
1,000,000 Kikuyu living throughout the Kikuyu reserves.116 A petition
from “more than 1,000 detainees” who were being held at the Athi
River Internment Camp alludes to the violent destruction of Kikuyu home-
steads by the British Army.117 Homes were burned to the ground, leaving
families destitute, while under-aged girls “were raped by [. . .] unscrupu-
lous members of the KAR [King’s African Riﬂes]118 and Home
Guards.”119 Following arrest, detainees held in police cells and barbed
wire encampments on the reserves were tortured by the police, security
forces, or members of the Kenya Regiment.120 This brutality included
the “castration of men by beating the sexual organs or by electrifying,”
and one of the Mutua and Others claimants, Paulo Muoka Nzili, was cas-
trated while detained at the Embakasi detention center in 1957.121 As noted
in the Athi River petition, Mau Mau suspects were hung upside-down by
their ankles for days on end, and their money, livestock, property, motor
vehicles, and other possessions were conﬁscated.122 At the same time,
neighbors with petty grievances took the opportunity to settle old scores,
and accused fellow residents of being Mau Mau adherents, inviting their
neighbors’ arrest, detention and disenfranchisement.
Life in the camps was severe, which is illuminated by letters smuggled
out of detention facilities. A letter of protest from “more than 2,000 detain-
ees” incarcerated on Mageta Island in Lake Victoria describes unsanitary
living conditions, whereby detainees were not allocated soap for personal
hygiene. On Mageta Island there were no professional health workers,
whereas at Athi River Rehabilitation Camp, which had a medical ofﬁcer,
civilising values” according to one inﬂuential settler; see Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 236.
The strategy’s true purpose was to destroy the supply lines issuing from bases of Kikuyu
support to active Mau Mau ﬁghters, and Elkins believes that the villages were “detention
camps all but in name,” and were punitive in nature, 237.
115. Bennett notes that there were 18,000 Home Guards in Central Province, Fighting the
Mau Mau, 13, 16.
116. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 42.
117. The petition dates from January 1954.
118. The King’s African Riﬂes was a battalion of the territorial Kenya Regiment.
119. TNA FCO 141/5667: A petition from more than 1,000 detainees, Athi River
Internment Camp to all party Parliamentary delegation, c/o Government House, Nairobi,
January 20, 1954. See also David Anderson and Julianne Weis, “Rape as a weapon of
war? Sexual violence in Mau Mau Kenya,” Law and History Review (forthcoming)Q16 .
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., and see Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce
[2012], para. 37.
122. Ibid.
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medical negligence allegedly led to the death of Stephen Kiunjuri, whose
raging fever was dismissed as “malingering.”123 Similarly, two detainees
involved in a motor accident on Mageta Island were left without medical
treatment for several days.124 In contravention of the basic safeguards set
out by Regulation 17, ﬂoggings occurred in the absence of medical super-
vision.125 Three separate petitions testiﬁed to a culture within the camps of
casual beatings where “ribs, legs and arms” were targeted by camp ofﬁcers
and warders.126 On Saiyusi Island Camp, warders used “clubs and sticks,
knives and whips” against detainees, and the petition urged the administra-
tion to send an investigation team, so that detainees could show investiga-
tors the “wounds, bruises and teeth cracks” that they acquired as a result of
beatings.127 These petitions were ineffectual because violence was autho-
rized by the colonial administration and associated with government sanc-
tioned detention policies, including, “screening,” “dilution,” forced labor,
and the “Mwea procedure,” discussed subsequently.
Screening
Screening was a procedure organized by the district administration, work-
ing with the British army, the Kenyan police reserves, loyalist chiefs, and
the Special Branch, through which entire villages were rounded up into
cordoned off enclosures and “screened;” in other words, questioned by a
screening team (usually the local police), who used the information for a
variety of purposes, including to arrest the “interrogatee.”128 The common
denominator across permutations of “screening” was “the extraction of in-
formation from suspects.”129 As such, screening was founded on the as-
sumption that “everyone was guilty until proved innocent.”130 To that
end, startlingly high arrest rates were achieved by some screening teams;
123. TNA FCO 141/5671: Letter from more than 2,000 detainees, Mageta Island to
Argwings Kodhek, November 20, 1956. TNA FCO 141/5667: A petition from more than
1,000 detainees, Athi River Internment Camp to all party Parliamentary delegation, c/o
Government House, Nairobi, January 20, 1954.
124. TNA FCO 141/5671: letter from more than 2,000 detainees, Mageta Island to
Argwings Kodhek, November 20, 1956.
125. Bennett also refers to the security forces ﬂogging Mau Mau suspects in “Fighting the
Mau Mau,” 161.
126. TNA FCO 141/5671: letter from more than 2,000 detainees, Mageta Island to
Argwings Kodhek, November 20, 1956.
127. TNA FCO 141/5667: letter from Saiyusi Island Camp, petition to the chief secretary
Nairobi, January 22, 1956.
128. For more on screening, see Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 76–90.
129. Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau, 15.
130. Ibid., 162.
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for example, 87% of 3,800 suspects screened in Nanyuki were subse-
quently arrested.131 In mid-1954, a massive screening operation dubbed
“Operation Rat Catcher” was launched in Nairobi, which resulted in
17,000 individuals being screened.132 Screening also formed an important
cornerstone of the confessional system that operated within the detention
camps. As mentioned, it was imperative for detainees to make full confes-
sions in order to progress through the rehabilitative “pipeline” that but-
tressed the network of camps.
Klose notes that British counterinsurgency techniques of this period de-
pended on “systematic mass torture to extract information about the covert
operation of the enemy,” and that all available means were operationalised
in the “battle for information.”133 Klose highlights some of the methods of
violence utilized during screening and interrogation in Kenya.134 The death
of Kabebe Macharia on September 15, 1958 occurred as a consequence of
an “extremely severe” beating at the hands of two Embu screeners.135
Following Macharia’s interrogation, he was removed to the camp dispen-
sary where he died later that evening. A postmortem revealed the cause
of death, and the two screeners were subsequently arrested and charged
with murder. Ahead of the trial, the governor conceded that “it seems
clear that brutality was used” against Macharia.136 It was, therefore, impor-
tant that rehabilitation staff were sent the message that government “will
not tolerate improper methods and where these occur the most rigorous ac-
tion will be taken to punish offenders.”137 No European ofﬁcer was present
during the screening, and transcripts of the disciplinary proceedings sug-
gested that it was “uncivilized African assistants” who were solely respon-
sible for the murder.138 The two accused were charged with murder, but
found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment.139
AgainstQ6 this and indicative of the racialization of justice, in 1953, two
European ofﬁcers responsible for the death of Elijah Gideon Njeru “were
aquitted of manslaughter and only ﬁned ﬁfty and one hundred pounds, re-
spectively, for battery.”140
131. Ibid., 163.
132. Ibid., 21.
133. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 173.
134. Ibid., 173–78.
135. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 339–40.
136. TNA FCO 141/6332: draft telegram from the governor (undated).
137. Ibid.
138. Even though, as Elkins points out, it is likely that the ofﬁcer in charge, Hugh
Galton-Fenzi, who was physically present elsewhere in the compound, heard Macharia’s
screams during interrogation, Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 340.
139. Ibid.
140. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 176.
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A judgment from 1954 noted with concern that there was evidence that
the defendants had been subjected to torture during screening “[f]rom this
case and others that have come to our notice it seems that it may be a com-
mon practice when a person is arrested in the commission of a terrorist of-
fence, or on suspicion of such offence, for the police to hand him over to
the custody of one of these teams where, if the accounts given are true, he
is subjected to a ‘softening up’ process, with the object of obtaining infor-
mation from him.”141 In short, the judge disclaimed confessions extracted
by “unlawful violence,” and although several branches of the colonial ad-
ministration denied responsibility for screening teams, the court found that
“such methods are the negation of the rule of law which it is the duty of
courts to uphold, and when instances come before the courts of allegations
that prisoners have been subjected to unlawful criminal violence, it is the
duty of such courts to insist on the fullest enquiry with a view to their ver-
iﬁcation or refutation.”142
Klose highlights the exemplary prosecution and conviction of a British
army captain, G.S.LQ3 . Grifﬁth, who offered incentives to his soldiers for
killing Mau Mau, and had “veriﬁably tortured then executed prisoners,”
however, as Klose observes, brutality during interrogation and detention
continued unabated.143 In response to persistent allegations, an Inquiry
into Screening Camps and Interrogation Centres was launched in 1954.
Sir Vincent Glenday, who chaired the inquiry, interpreted his terms of ref-
erence narrowly, as signifying the creation of prospective recommenda-
tions, rather than a retrospective examination of the allegations that had
already come to light. Glenday completely overlooked the violence of
screening when he described it as “a process to obtain or extract a confes-
sion by intensive interrogation from a multiple of facts and based on a
promise of clemency if the confession be judged full and a veiled threat
of reprisal if it be not so considered. To avoid any possible misinterpreta-
tion of this I should explain that whereas in the beginning considerable and
often undesirable pressure was applied in some Camps, to-day it has
generally been reduced to what is terms ‘the psychological fear of being
arrested and taken to the Camp as a detainee’.”144 Glenday assumed that
screening was successful because of efﬁcacious threats and psychological
141. Criminal Appeals 988 and 989 of 1954 (from Emergency Assize Criminal Case No.
584 of 1954 of HM Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi), Kenya National Archives (here-
after KNA)Q12,Q17 : MLA 1/1098, cited in Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and
Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 126.
142. Ibid.
143. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 178.
144. TNA FCO 141/6521: “An Inquiry into Screening Camps and Interrogation Centres
under the Control of the Provincial Administration,” (The Glenday Report), 1954.
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pressure, but even the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in Kenya,
General George Erskine, recognized that it was a violent process, “I am
quite certain prisoners were beaten to extract information.”145 Invoking
the diseased mind thesis, Glenday reported that “our Screening Camps
are now mainly used for redemption or cleansing purposes so that a con-
taminated person may once again be accepted by his people as clear and
ready to assist the Government if called upon to do so.”146 Steering
clear of any evidence that testiﬁed to the violence of screening, Glenday
largely supported the procedure, although he questioned the validity of
“re-screening,” which entailed repeated screenings (one detainee could
be screened three or four times), while accepting its purported cathartic ef-
fects. Screening continued and in a letter to Governor Baring dated
November 1954, the Chief of Police, Colonel Arthur Young,147 highlight-
ed the horrors of “some of the so-called Screening Camps which. . . how
present a state of affairs so deplorable that they should be investigated
without delay.”148 Young suggested that “elementary principles of justice
and humanity” were not being observed in these camps; however, his crit-
icisms were unacknowledged.149
Dilution
“Dilution” was a technique whereby a small number of “hard-core incorri-
gibles” were housed with cooperating detainees, who were tasked with
“convincing” the noncooperating detainees to accept the “rehabilitative”
regime of the works camp and to confess their Mau Mau activities.150 In
the surviving records, the ﬁrst reference to its usage is in May 1956,
when a rehabilitation ofﬁcer, Major James Breckenridge, wrote to senior
ofﬁcers at the Gathigiriri camp, drawing attention to an allegation that
“Jasiel Njau [a rehabilitation assistant] had been putting detainees in the
cells for refusing to confess to their Mau Mau activities and that he had
either beaten them himself or instructed Warders to do so.”151 Matters
145. TNA WO 32/15834: letter from Erskine to the secretary of state for war, December
10, 1953.
146. TNA FCO 141/6521: The Glenday Report, 1954.
147. For more detail on Colonel’s Young position in relation to detention violence, see
s. 3 belowQ18 .
148. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 179.
149. Ibid.
150. TNA FCO 141/6301: letter from Governor Baring to MCDQ19 regarding the death of
detainee called Muchiri at Gathigiriri Works Camp, February 4, 1957.
151. TNA FCO 141/6301: Thomas Askwith, on behalf of the minister for community de-
velopment to the attorney-general, February 11, 1957.
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came to a head when a detainee, Muchiri Githuma, succumbed to the vi-
olence meted out by Njau and a number of “cooperating” detainees on
January 25, 1957.152 Initially charged with murder, Njau and the detainees
were later convicted of assault causing actual bodily harm,153 and the event
was portrayed as “an isolated incident” stemming from “the excessive and
misguided zeal of the Rehabilitation Assistant.”154
Thomas Askwith, the Secretary of Community Development and
Rehabilitation, wrote to the attorney-general in consideration of the
Githuma case, calling attention to a previous complaint raised by Major
Breckenridge regarding the camp’s Community Development Ofﬁcer,
C.GQ3 . Hirst, and the ofﬁcer in charge of Gathigiriri, Commander
Rowe.155Q3 Writing to the colonial secretary, the governor indicated that
Hirst was directly involved in the Githuma case, as he did not attempt to
stop the improper use of force. Hirst admitted that after Githuma “had
been revived from unconsciousness,” he forced Githuma to “run up and
down pursued by another detainee with a rubber strap shortly before he ﬁnal-
ly collapsed and died.”156 The attorney-general advised Governor Baring that
no criminal charges could be supported by the evidence against Hirst and
Rowe, but that “disciplinary proceedings. . . are being considered.”157
As a method of dilution, sometimes “a bucket of water [was] thrown at
the man,” which acted as “a form of shock treatment,” and had a “most
salutary effect.”158 On one occasion, a detainee, Kariuki Muriithi, died
from hypothermia following water “shock treatment” during an attempted
conversion at Athi River Detention Camp on July 18, 1957.159 The coroner
revealed that Muriithi had died from exposure to the cold, and seven de-
tainees were charged with manslaughter. The accused informed the court
152. TNA FCO 141/6301: letter from Governor Baring to the minister for community de-
velopment regarding the death of detainee called Muchiri at Gathigiriri Works Camp,
February 4, 1957.
153. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 333.
154. TNA FCO 141/6301: B.A.Q3 Ohanga, Minister for Community Development letter to
Baring, February 7, 1957.
155. TNA FCO 141/6301: Askwith correspondence to the attorney-general, February 11,
1957.
156. TNA FCO 141/6301: from the governor to the secretary of state for the colonies,
March 21, 1957. On another occasion, Hirst discovered a detainee hanging upside-down
by his ankles, and although he ordered his staff to cut the detainee down, he took no further
action, Ibid.
157. Ibid., and see TNA CO 1017/535: C.G. Hirst, Community Development Ofﬁcer,
Kenya: termination of contract, 1955.
158. TNA FCO 141/6301: undated memorandum on the rehabilitation of “Zs” by an un-
named government ministry.
159. FCO 141/6304: judgment of seven men charged with manslaughter of Kariuki
Muriithi, July 18, 1957.
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that they were acting under the orders of the camp commandant and Major
BreckenbridgeQ3 , the Camp Rehabilitation Ofﬁcer. Breckenridge admitted
authorizing detainees to sprinkle water on the detainee’s face if he ap-
peared to be falling asleep. The judge deemed the authorization to be un-
fortunate, but no charges were preferred against the British ofﬁcers.
Although following orders was not a valid defense in law, the judge con-
cluded that it was as a mitigating factor, and in judgment, six of the ac-
cused were found guilty and sentenced to 1 month’s imprisonment.160
The Mwea Procedure
Writing to the colonial secretary on June 25, 1957, Governor Baring
commented on the “very hopeful results” that were being achieved
from the dilution technique, but noted that in its application on a
“small number of very difﬁcult men[. . .] risks are unavoidable.”161
Apart from the Githuma killing, other incidents, such as a riot at Athi
River Camp, had slowed down the progression of detainees through the
“pipeline,” and to overcome these difﬁculties an administrative ofﬁcer,
Terry Gavaghan, introduced a modiﬁed dilution procedure, known as
the “Mwea technique.” By this method, “hard-core” detainees arriving
from Manyani camp were brought from the station in batches of twenty,
with each group staggered at 15 minute intervals. Cooperating detainees
accompanied the new intakes at a ratio of 10 to 1, and all steps “to deal
with refractory detainees” were to be taken by staff instead of cooperating
detainees. Although some success had been achieved in securing detainee
compliance, Baring considered that additional regulatory powers were re-
quired. To this end, he explained:
The resistance of these men breaks down quickly in the great majority of
cases under a form of psychological shock. . . Gavaghan has been perfectly
open with us. He has said that he can stop secret beatings such as that
which occurred in the case of Jasiel Njau. He has said that he can cope
with a regular ﬂow in of Manyani “Zs” and turn them out later to the district
camps. We believe that he will be able to go on doing this a very long way
down the list of the worst detainees. But he can only do it if the hard cases are
dealt with on their ﬁrst arrival in a rough way. We have instituted careful
safeguards, a medical examination before and after the arrival of the intake,
the presence of the ofﬁcer in charge all the time, the force being used by
European staff only.162
160. Ibid.
161. FCO 141/6303: letter from Governor Baring to the colonial secretary, dated June 25,
1957.
162. Ibid.
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Either the whole procedure crafted by Gavaghan must be abandoned, ar-
gued Governor Baring, or “alternatively, we must give him and his staff
cover provided they do as they say they are doing.”163 In consequence,
the Attorney-General, Eric Grifﬁth-Jones, drafted a detailed memo outlin-
ing the Mwea procedure, and drafted a regulation to cover the violence
planned under the scheme. Undoubtedly, this legally dubious framework
gave the colonial secretary cause for concern.164 A draft memo in the
Hanslope ﬁles refers to a ministerial visit to the Mwea camp; the visiting
party included the attorney-general, the minister for African affairs, the
minister for community development, the special commissioner (C.MQ3 .
Johnston), the commissioner of prisons, the acting secretary for defence,
and the district commissioner of Embu, and the party witnessed at ﬁrst
hand the Mwea intake procedure.165 Gavaghan accompanied the party, ex-
plaining the full particulars of the operation.166 After the new arrivals were
hustled off the trucks by European prison and rehabilitation staff and
through a barbed wire cul-de-sac catwalk:
The detainees were ordered to squat in two rows, one at each said of the cat-
walk. The “receptionists” from the last intake then handed out the camp
clothing to each man and set about shaving their heads with the hair clippers
and razors, talking to the new arrivals as they did so. The detainees were or-
dered to change into the camp clothing. Any who showed any reluctance or
hesitation to do so were hit with ﬁsts and/or slapped with the open hand. This
was usually enough to dispel any disposition to disobey the order to change.
In some cases, however, deﬁance was more obstinate, and on the ﬁrst indica-
tion of such obstinacy three or four of the European ofﬁcers immediately con-
verged on the man and “rough-housed” him, stripping his clothes off him,
hitting him, on occasion kicking him, and, if necessary, putting him on the
ground. Blows struck were solid, hard ones, mostly with closed ﬁsts and
about the head, stomach, sides and back. There was no attempt to strike at
testicles or any other manifestations of sadistic brutality; the performance
was a deliberate, calculated and robust assault, accompanied by constant
and imperative demands that the man should do as he was told and change
his clothes.167
163. Ibid.
164. A draft of this document is contained in the Hanslope ﬁles under the new catalogue
reference: TNA FCO 141/6303.
165. TNA FCO 141/6303: details of the ministerial visit are omitted from the ﬁnal draft
sent to the Colonial Ofﬁce, see TNA CO 822/1251.
166. TNA FCO 141/6303: ‘“Dilution” Detention Camps. Use of Force in Enforcing
Discipline.”Q20
167. Ibid., exactly the same text appears in the ﬁnal document.
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Some “deﬁant” individuals attempted to raise the “Mau Mau moan,” and,
therefore, “it was essential to prevent the infection of this ‘moan’ spreading
through the camp, and accordingly a resister who started it was promptly
put on the ground, a foot placed on his throat and mud stuffed in his
mouth. A man whose resistance could not be broken down was in the
last resort knocked unconscious.”168 Thereafter, the new intakes were forc-
ibly shorn, and resisters were met with violence, similar to the violence at
reception. In addition, when a detainee was asked if he intended to obey
the camp regime “if he said ‘no’ or did not answer, he was immediately
struck and, if necessary, compelled to obey by the use of force in the
manner described above. Out of the total intake the part witnessed that
day about a dozen needed minor ‘persuasion’ and 4 or 5 pretty rough
treatment.”169
The concept of integrating the technique into the intake procedure was
“to compel immediate submission to discipline and compliance with or-
ders, and to do so by a psychological shock treatment which throws off bal-
ance and overcomes any disposition towards deﬁance or resistance.”170
Shock treatment was justiﬁed because those “Z” category detainees arriv-
ing from Manyani were “particularly ugly customers” according to the
attorney- general, and were impervious to “orthodox methods of non-
violent persuasion.”171 Indeed, he added, they were the type who
understood violence, when there was no appreciable response to “gentler
treatment.”172 Serious injury was to be avoided, and to this end, the
attorney-general explained how violence should be delivered in practice.173
Placing responsibility for Mwea procedure beatings in the hands of
European ofﬁcers was supposed to mitigate the consequences of dilution.
Grifﬁth-Jones was concerned about the impact that the administration of
violence would have on the European ofﬁcers involved, and urged the co-
lonial secretary to support these ofﬁcers “charged with this most difﬁcult,
dangerous and unenviable task.”174 To convey his point, the attorney-
general referred to the Prison Rules of England, 1949, and read an implied
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid., exactly the same text appears in the ﬁnal document.
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. Ibid.
173. “Serious injury must be avoided; kicking with boots or shoes should not be permit-
ted; vulnerable parts of the body should not be struck, particularly the spleen, liver and kid-
neys; accordingly any blows should be conﬁned to the upper part of the body and should
avoid any area below the chest, front or back,” Ibid.
174. Ibid.
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power to violence in rule 34(1) of the English code, to frame the following
draft regulation
[d]iscipline and order shall be maintained with ﬁrmness. Force shall not be
used in dealing with detained persons save when necessary to enforce disci-
pline and preserve good order, and no more force than is necessary shall
be used. Moreover, save by or under the personal direction of the
ofﬁcer-in-charge or, in the case of his absence or incapacity, the senior prison
ofﬁcer present in the camp, force shall not be used under this regulation
except when immediately necessary to restrain or overpower a refractory
detained person, or compel compliance with a lawful order or to prevent
disorder.175
Thomas Askwith witnessed the moderated intake procedure on July 11,
1957, which was based on the attorney-general’s draft regulation. A num-
ber of the procedures were “substantially the same;” however, there were
some additional and troubling practices that violated the attorney- general’s
direction that injurious force should not be used, and Askwith “saw one
man lifted up by an Ofﬁcer to shoulder height and thrown down on the
ground on his back three times.”176 Blows to the head were frequent, a
practice that was explicitly prohibited in the attorney- general’s directive:
“one detainee at Mwea resolutely refused to respond in spite of a most
drastic beat-up. He was thereupon dragged to the cells where Mr.
Gavaghan informed me he would be subjected to third degree methods
until he did, in fact, obey all orders given. The measures adopted were
to be kept awake all night, having water thrown at him and to be beaten
up on a variety of pretexts.”177 AgainstQ6 this, it is notable that Askwith’s
report, warning about the dangers of the Mwea procedure, was written
only 6 days before Kariuki Muriithi died in his Gathigiriri cell after
being subjected to water “shock treatment.”178 Askwith remained uncon-
vinced of the technique’s purported “successes,” questioning whether a
state of “cowed submission” could be long-lasting, and adding that “the
methods employed are the negation of everything that rehabilitation has
stood for so far.”179 Given the number of staff and detainees involved in
the procedure, Askwith warned that it might become public knowledge,
175. TNA CO 822/1251: ‘“Dilution” Detention Camps. Use of Force in Enforcing
Discipline.”
176. TNA FCO 141/6303: Rehabilitation – Mwea Camps, report by Thomas Askwith,
Provincial Secretary for Community Development, July 12, 1957.
177. Ibid.
178. See s.Q21 on “Dilution” above.
179. TNA FCO 141/6303: Rehabilitation – Mwea Camps, report by Askwith, July 12,
1957.
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which would clearly be disagreeable to the British public.180 There is no
evidence that Askwith’s report ever reached the Colonial Ofﬁce in
Whitehall, as he was quickly and quietly marginalized by the Kenyan ad-
ministration.181 Terry Gavaghan wrote a robust defense of his techniques,
contested the substance of Askwith’s report, and further accused Askwith
of encouraging his “dirty work,” insofar as Askwith allegedly made the
following comment, “Don’t think I am squeamish at all about this,” during
a camp visit.182
In the meantime, the colonial secretary was reluctant to approve
Grifﬁth-Jones’s regulation, and the matter triggered great debate among co-
lonial legal advisors in London. Shortly afterwards, Governor Baring dis-
cussed the matter with senior legal advisors at the Colonial Ofﬁces and
signalled the possibility that he would accept an amended version of the
Mwea procedure. First, detainees who refused a lawful order, such as
the requirement to move from one compound to another, or to change
their clothing, could be compelled to do so by means of “overpowering
force,” for which regulatory powers were already in existence. Second,
committing a major offense, such as defying a lawful order, could attract
on the spot corporal punishment (caning not exceeding twelve strokes).183
Extant summary punishment procedures for dealing with recalcitrant de-
tainees could be invoked.184 When the colonial secretary questioned
whether these powers would be sufﬁcient in view of the critical task of
maintaining the ﬂow of detainees through the rehabilitation system, the
governor responded that whereas the “treatment proposed would not ad-
minister the same psychological shock to the detainees,” it was “adequate
to be effective.”185 A telegram was duly dispatched to Kenya, and the
Acting Governor, Richard Turnbull, circulated instructions for the modi-
ﬁed procedure to the commissioner for prisons, the ministry for defence,
the ministry for African affairs, and the attorney-general, specifying that
the use of “beating force” was to be abandoned forthwith, and “overpow-
ering force” used instead.186 Power to conﬁrm corporal punishment
180. Ibid.
181. As a result of going against the tide, Askwith’s colonial career abruptly ended and
his contract was terminated in December 1957; seeQ22 From Mau Mau to Harambee:
Memoirs and Memoranda of Colonial Kenya (Cambridge: Cambridge African
Monographs, 1995).
182. TNA FCO 141/6303: “Report on Mwea Intake by Secretary for Community
Development,” addressed to F.A.Q3 Loyd, Provincial Commissioner, Nyeri, July 22 ,1957.
183. TNA CO 822/1251: note of a meeting by J.I.F.Q3 Buist, July 16, 1957.
184. The Emergency (Detained Persons) Regulations 1954, s. 17(a).
185. TNA CO 822/1251: Note by W.A.C. Mathieson, July 18, 1957.
186. TNA FCO 141/6303: Mwea Procedure by Acting Governor, R.G. Turnbull, July 17,
1957.
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was additionally delegated to the assistant commissioner and the deputy
commissioner of prisons, one of whom had to be present at each new intake.
In this manner, the sentence of corporal punishment could be conﬁrmed on
the spot.187 In a sense, modifying the regulatory framework of detainee “cor-
poreal violence” was an experiment with disciplinary techniques and tech-
nologies of governance that aimed to maintain colonial power in the camps.
The modiﬁed Mwea procedure had the unintended consequence of slow-
ing down the passage of detainees through the pipeline, because the ofﬁcer
in charge had to formally conﬁrm and oversee the execution of corporal
punishment on individual detainees. To expedite the process, noncooperat-
ing detainees were physically separated from cooperating detainees and
punished en masse.188 The governor met with Gavaghan, John Cowan
(the senior prison ofﬁcer in charge of the Mwea camps), and several gov-
ernment ministers at Government House on August 6, 1957 to tease out the
ﬁner details of the modiﬁed procedure.189 The governor highlighted the
following points, “the force to be used should be overpowering force
only,” and that “in order to defend the position it was very important
that over a period of, say three months, the percentage beaten following or-
derly room proceedings should not exceed about 10%,” and, ﬁnally, that
“we should keep up-to-date each month a dossier showing the results ob-
tained with all detainees taken into the Mwea and particularly with those
who at the time of intake had been beaten.”190 Cowan afﬁrmed the imple-
mentation of the procedure, describing the intake of detainees at Mwea
camp “[t]he ﬁrst batch of 20 arrived at Mwea camp at approximately
12.15pm and immediately offered strong resistance to being shaved and
clothed. Considerable overpowering force was necessary in probably 15
cases out of 20 and the ﬁnal instruction to proceed to the compound was
only accepted after frequent and aggressive repetition.”191 “Rough meth-
ods” were similarly required in dealing with three subsequent batches,
but only two men received the ofﬁcial punishment.192 There was a gradual
187. Ibid.
188. TNA FCO 141/6303: letter to Jack Cusack from Gavaghan, July 27, 1957.
189. TNA FCO 141/6303: meeting at Government House, August 8, 1957. In attendance
at this meeting were Governor Baring, John Cowan, Terry Gavaghan, and government
ministers.
190. Ibid.
191. TNA FCO 141/6303: letter to the commissioner of prisons from Cowan, dated
August 10, 1957.
192. Ibid., in a subsequent report from Cowan, the Commissioner of Prisons, “No resis-
tance was encountered from the Gathigiriri intake with the exception of the ﬁrst man into the
compound who instantly fought like a fanatic. This man was dangerous, striking both ofﬁ-
cers and warders, and had to be severely restrained apart from receiving twelve strokes.” The
man who received the beating remained “uncompromising,” August 16, 1957.
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disjunction among some of the safeguards that were supposed to be applied
to the modiﬁed technique, and the actual implementation in practice. A
Special Branch Ofﬁcer, I.PQ3 . Kelloway, noted that detainees who wished
to make a confession were immediately screened, whereas “[t]he remainder
are asked individually if they have taken an oath. If they deny having taken
an oath they are given summary punishment which usually consists of a
good beating up. This treatment usually breaks a large proportion. If this
treatment does not bear fruit the detainee is taken to the far end of the
camp where buckets of stones are waiting. These buckets are placed on
the detainee’s head and he is made to run around in circles until he agrees
to confess the oath.”193 Kelloway observed that approximately 80% of the
new detainees confessed on the day of their arrival, whereas others took a
day or thereabouts to comply. He further remarked that “at Thiba Works
Camp the treatment usually consists of beating the man with the regulation
baton which to date and to my knowledge, has resulted in one person being
placed in hospital with broken arms and a leg, and another person suffering
a perforated ear-drum. At Gathigiriri one person received injuries but to
what extent I have been unable to ascertain as I was not present. Any
other injuries that may have been caused have not been brought to my no-
tice.”194 When the provincial commissioner learned of Kelloway’s report,
he advised against investigating the matter, because “an investigation
would have a strong adverse effect on the morale of ofﬁcers at the
Mwea Camps, who, in any event had a most difﬁcult and distasteful job
to perform and that the report was untrue or at best greatly exaggerated
in certain essentials.”195 In the end, “overwhelming force” was in practice
no different from “beating force,” the only difference was semantic; on
September 12, 1958, a detainee arriving at Agathi camp from Nyeri
Prison died after undergoing the modiﬁed Mwea procedure. A postmortem
revealed signiﬁcant external injuries, and the cause of death was recorded
as a pulmonary embolism.196
Forced Labor and the Cowan Plan
The United Kingdom was instrumental in garnering support for the 1930
ILOQ8 Forced Labour Convention, which had the effect of immediately
193. TNA FCO 141/6303: I.P. Kelloway, Ofﬁcer in Charge of Detainee Section, Special
Branch, Embu, writing to the senior assistant commissioner of police, November 28, 1957.
194. Ibid.
195. TNA FCO 141/6303:Q3 Trent to the commissioners of police, Catling, December 19,
1957.
196. TNA FCO 141/6305: letter to the permanent secretary for home affairs from the pro-
vincial commissioner, Central Province, September 17, 1958.
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prohibiting all forms of forced labor for private purposes.197 The primary
task of the 1930 Forced Labour Convention was to eliminate the conditions
under which individuals were coerced into slavery or slave-like situa-
tions.198 Daniel Maul notes that there were loopholes in the Convention,
such as with military service, penal servitude following criminal convic-
tion, and service that could be considered as part of the “normal civic ob-
ligations of citizens.”199 The following exemption to the prohibition on
forced labor found in Article 2(2)(d) of the 1930 Convention was relied
on by the British government in rationalizing its forced labor policy:
“any work or service exacted in cases of emergency, that is to say, in
the event of war or of a calamity or threatened calamity, such as ﬁre,
ﬂood, famine, earthquake, violent epidemic or epizootic diseases, invasion
by animal, insect or vegetable pests, and in general any circumstance that
would endanger the existence or the well-being of the whole or part of the
population.”200 The limited impact of ILO norms on the colonies has been
critiqued by Maul who suggested that separate and less stringent rules ap-
plied to the colonies before the Second World War, and further, that “nei-
ther the internal power structures of the ILO nor the thinking of its ofﬁcials
permitted the application of the regular canon of norms to the colonies.”201
Following the war, the self-determination ambitions of colonial states
were, in principle, supported by the United States, and, therefore, postwar
exploitation of the colonies had to be carefully justiﬁed by the United
Kingdom.202 During a governor’s emergency meeting on April 16,1953,
a ﬁnance ofﬁcial highlighted the twin effect of making detainees work
“from the point of view of morale, as well as ﬁnance.”203 The Colonial
Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, quickly authorized a regulation that permitted
the extraction of labor from detainee suspects held in camps across the col-
ony, powers that were contained in the Emergency (Detained Persons)
Regulations 1953.204 The ordinance was subsequently modiﬁed in an effort
197. Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 24, 25. For more back-
ground on the United Kingdom’s engagement in this process, see TNA CO 323/1027:
“Proposed International Convention on forced labour.”
198. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 29.
199. Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 27.
200. C029 - Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Convention concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labour, (Entry into force: May 1, 1932) Adoption: Geneva, 14th ILCQ23 session
(June 28, 1930), article 2(2)(d).
201. Maul, Human Rights, Development and Decolonization, 27.
202. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society, 112.
203. TNA FCO 141/5666: Governor’s Emergency Meeting, Memo for the Member of
Legal Affairs, April 16, 1953.
204. TNA FCO 141/5666: memorandum on the forced labor regulation by R.I.Q3 Guthrie,
Assistant Legal Drafstman, April 30, 1953.
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to comply with international law, but on the whole, these efforts were cos-
metic, and completely disregarded the illegal violence that was used to
compel detainees to work. Forced labor became a ﬂashpoint of violence
between uncooperative detainees refusing to work and the camp authorities
who used “compelling force” to enact the policy. The implementation of
the scheme resulted in detainee deaths, most notably the notorious 1959
Hola Massacre, during which 11 detainees were killed. A closer examina-
tion of the “migrated archives” reveals several other violent incidents asso-
ciated with forced labor prior to the events of March 3, 1959.
Serious allegations were promulgated in a detainee petition from
Manyani Special Detention Camp, which was addressed to the secretary
of state for the colonies, calling on the government to investigate “[t]he
many deaths which occurred among the detainees who catered for the dig-
ging of the Embakasi Air Field. It is a fact that while the detainees per-
formed the task they suffered malicious and brutish beatings by the
warders, and this brought about an average of three “on the spot” deaths
per day, during 1953–1954.”205 H.F.HQ3 . Durant, the ofﬁcer in charge of
Manyani Special Detention Camp, categorically denied the allegations of
brutality, which, in his estimation, were a “collection of wild and mislead-
ing generalities without support by any concrete evidence” and “gross and
unjustiﬁed allegations” against European ofﬁcers.206 As it turns out, a 1955
memo by the Ministry of Defence on the “Movement of Detainees from
Reception Centres to Works Camps” unequivocally states that certain de-
velopment projects were “planned on the assumption that free convict la-
bour [would] be available,” and that the Embakasi airport development
was one such project,207 “[i]n order to keep up the labour force on certain
essential projects such as Embakasi airport, it will be necessary in the next
few months to transfer convicts from a number of the more remote prisons
and prison camps.”208 That was to say, ex-convicts, having served their
sentences, were issued detention orders and forced to work on these
205. TNA FCO 141/5667: petition sent from J.G. Kariuki and S.M. MachariaQ3 from
Manyani Special Detention Camp to the secretary of state for the colonies, April 1956.
206. TNA FCO 141/5667: H.F.H. Durant to the commissioner of prisons, May 12, 1956.
207. An allegation submitted by CaptainQ3 Law, a former ofﬁcer in the prisons systems, re-
fers to “alleged beatings of Embakasi convicts in March 1958 and implies that convicts were
merely refusing to come out and were not violent and that excessive forces was used by
Turner, Haig-Thomas, Carnie, Bird and Morton. There was no resistance and prisoners
could not defend themselves – ‘it was just a murderous onslaught’.” It is not clear whether
Law was referring to detainees working on the Embakasi project, see TNA FCO 141/6307:
telegram from the colonial secretary to the governor, September 29, 1959.
208. TNA FCO 141/6520: Movement of Detainees from Reception Centres to Works
Camps, Council of Ministers on the Resettlement Committee. Memorandum by the
Ministry of Defence, May 5, 1955.
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projects for nominal remuneration, “paid from Emergency funds.”209 It
was estimated that approximately half of the 6,500 Kikuyu prisoners due
to be released in 1955 would be served detention orders, and immediately
reassigned to these “essential projects.”210 A letter composed by Mageta
Island detainees in November 1956 remarked that “50 detainees were
charged of refusing accepting [sic] work at the pay of 8/- per month and
were sentenced to 2 years hard labour,” and although the commissioner
of prisons contested other allegations contained therein, this speciﬁc accu-
sation was ignored.211
There may have been some truth to the charge that detainees who re-
fused to work at Mageta Island were criminalized for disobedience, and,
therefore, received additional penal servitude. There was one such reported
incident at the camp in June 1956, when detainees refused to work at bush
clearing.212 Up until that point, refusing to work was deemed a minor of-
fense, a violation that could only be punished by a verbal reprimand, re-
duced diet, denial of privileges, or solitary conﬁnement for up to 7 days.
The Kenyan administration sought to redeﬁne disobedience as a major of-
fense, punishable by corporal punishment.213 Repeat offences, under
Section 23 of the Regulations, could result in “prosecution before a subor-
dinate court and on conviction [. . .] imprisonment for a term not exceeding
two years.”214 W.A.CQ3 . Mathieson, a senior legal advisor with the Colonial
Ofﬁce, realized that “in effect, therefore, the Governor is asking for author-
ity to employ corporal punishment to break this strike.”215 He sought coun-
sel from Colonel HeatonQ3 , a member of the Colonial Ofﬁce’s Advisory
Committee on the Treatment of Offenders and a former commissioner of
prisons in Kenya, who, although doubtful as to whether the punishment
would expedite the forced labor scheme, considered that “discipline must
be reasserted and that it would be wrong to withhold the use of this weapon
from those in Kenya who have the responsibility for enforcing disci-
pline.”216 Mathieson accepted this view, and advocated for the “authority
209. It is unclear from the Ministry of Defence memo whether these individuals had been
convicted of ordinary crimes or terrorist-related offenses, see ibid.
210. Ibid.
211. TNA FCO 141/5671: A letter on behalf of 2,000 detainees at Mageta Island,
November 20, 1956.
212. TNA FCO 141/6322: War Council, the Emergency (Detained Persons) Regulations,
1954, memorandum by the minister for defence.
213. The new regulation covered: “Disobedience in such manner as to show wilful deﬁ-
ance of authority, of any order lawfully given,” in ibid.
214. Ibid.
215. TNA CO 822/802: Memo by W.A.C. Mathieson, August 27, 1956.
216. Ibid.
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to use this weapon.”217 The next day, the colonial secretary sent Governor
Baring a telegram authorizing the creation of the additional major of-
fense;218 the amending regulation was published on September 4, and on
September 10, strikers at Mageta Island were informed of the new pow-
ers.219 Disciplinary action was taken against the detainees who persistently
refused to work, and a telegram from Baring to the colonial secretary indi-
cates that ﬁfty Mageta Island detainees who refused to work were to be
prosecuted under Regulation 23, corroborating the detainees’ complaint
mentioned previously.220
The matter did not end there. The Mageta Island petition alluded to a vi-
olent incident during which detainees were beaten, “shorts [sic] were ﬁred in
one of the camps holding 800 men, and 13 people were wounded.”221 By
contrast, the ofﬁcial version recounted a story of violent detainees armed
with “stones and other materials” attacking a prison party, and in this narra-
tive, Greener guns were only discharged so that the party could withdraw.222
The “belligerent” detainees were deprived of water and food for a number of
days, after which point a military squad went into the compound to “disarm”
them “[t]his was done and in the course of the operation some 30 to 40 de-
tainees suffered from minor superﬁcial injuries, of whom some 22 had their
cuts subsequently stitched by the Medical Ofﬁcer. At the same time 15 ring-
leaders were extracted from the compounds and placed in the small cells
where disciplinary action under Section 17 of the Emergency (Detained
Persons) Regulations, 1954 is to be undertaken.”223 The commissioner of
prisons sanctioned the use of corporal punishment, not only for the “ring-
leaders,” but also for the remaining 860 detainees.224
A letter written by Mbirua Githua smuggled out of Aguthi camp to a
British MP alleged that eighty-seven detainees had been badly beaten
upon reception to the camp on October 24, 1958.225 A former ofﬁcer in
217. Ibid.
218. TNA CO 822/802: telegram from the colonial secretary to the governor of Kenya,
August 28, 1956.
219. TNA CO 822/802: telegram from Governor Baring to the colonial secretary,
September 19, 1956.
220. TNA CO 822/802: telegram from Governor Baring to the colonial secretary, October
3, 1956.
221. TNA FCO 141/5671: a letter on behalf of 2,000 detainees at Mageta Island,
November 20, 1956. (The date on the letter precedes an event described therein.)
222. TNA FCO 141/6322: Disturbances at Mageta Island, report written by J.H. Lewis,
Commissioner of Prisons, November 28, Commissioner of Prisons.
223. Ibid.
224. Ibid.
225. TNA FCO 141/5662: This letter is mentioned in a memorandum by D.W.Q3 Conroy,
Attorney-General, May 27, 1959.
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charge of the camp wrote a most forthright account of the intake when
“some Kikuyu detainees started to boo and taunt those who had submitted
confessions to the Screening teams,” and he realized that “something had
to be done. . .”226 and that “they had obviously to be brought under control,
and as they would not listen to commands from me or the camp staff I
called in the Special Platoon to deal with them. These warders used batons
on the more aggressive detainees, and inevitably some were badly bruised.
The doctor considered that a few men, (I think, four), should be treated at
the camp dispensary.”227 Men who refused to work the following day “re-
ceived” lights blows with batons, whereas on the 3rd day the “recalci-
trants” were put on half rations. The strike lasted until November 22,
1958, when thirteen “non-cooperating detainees” were sent to Karaba
camp. Nine of these detainees “confessed” and were returned to Aguthi,
where they subsequently retracted their confessions. Permission was grant-
ed to cane these nine men; eight of whom were caned on December 16.
The ofﬁcer in charge of the camp admitted certain irregularities as regards
the punishment:
I must also testify to the fact that in some cases more than the stipulated num-
bers of strokes were given. Moreover, previous experience had taught me that
punishment with the regulation prisons case had no effect other than to make
the detainees mock at the authorities and deliberately try to incur more pun-
ishment to show how little they cared. I mentioned this to my superior ofﬁ-
cers on occasions before this incident occurred and suggested that, if corporal
punishment was approved, it was presumably intended to make some real im-
pression and therefore something other than the kind of cane which was used
to punish me at school should be employed, namely a “kiboko.” I gathered
the impression that everyone agreed with me and that is why a “kiboko”
was used and not the regulation cane ordered in the signal from the SSP.
A member of the staff entered the punishment as twelve strokes in the register
before the beating. When I went to sign the register after the beating it was
agreed not to alter the entry.228
The attorney-general instituted a Criminal Investigation Department (CID)
probe into the caning because there had been no inquiry prior to sentenc-
ing, a regulation cane was not used, and excessive strokes had been deliv-
ered.229 However, instead of criminal charges being made against the
ofﬁcer who authorized the use of the “kiboko,” “severe disciplinary action”
226. TNA FCO 141/5662: letter fromQ3 Brooks to the minister of home affairs, May 13,
1959.
227. Ibid.
228. Ibid.
229. TNA FCO 141/5662: memorandum by D.W.Q3 Conway to the Ministry for African
Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, May 27, 1959.
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was instituted by C.MQ3 . Johnson, the Minister for African Affairs.230 In a
sense, deﬁning the action as a “disciplinary violation” sabotaged the CID in-
quiry, and the criminal investigation was subsequently abandoned.231
The violence of the state in enforcing the forced labor policy was laid
bare when detainees persistently refused to work at Hola detention
camp. In a meeting at Government House, the permanent secretary of
the ministry for African affairs stated that Hola received “the dregs of
the Mau Mau barrel.”232 In receiving these “violent men from Manyani”
and “persons unacceptable in the Central Province,” the permanent secre-
tary reminded D.AQ3 . Marsden, the district ofﬁcer in charge of the settlement
camps at Hola, that “certain persons are always ready to listen to com-
plaints from detainees, even though the statements made are false and ex-
aggerated. It is essential that there should be no grounds for any legitimate
complaint. Prisons rules and detention camp regulations must be followed
precisely.”233 However, in August 1958, a number of detainees were
“beaten because they refused duty,” resulting in the hospitalization of
four detainees.234 This incident would have been assigned to the annals
of historical amnesia, were it not for the killings at the camp later in
March 1959.
From the declassiﬁed archives, it appears that there were two key factors
that led to the creation of the Cowan plan, the forced labor policy imple-
mented at Hola on March 3, 1959. First, the Commissioner of Prisons,
John H. Lewis, noted with frustration on February 5, 1959, that there
were a number of “apparently able-bodied men” “malingering” about
Hola, refusing to work outside the camp.235 A second source of frustration
for camp ofﬁcials was that even the detainees who were working (“out on
shamba”) were adopting a “go slow” policy and were not achieving their
designated labor targets.236 The Cowan plan would tackle both of these
problems; summary punishment, that is on the spot corporal punishment,
230. Ibid.
231. TNA FCO 141/5662: letter from C.M. Johnston to the minister for legal affairs, June
3, 1959.
232. TNA FCO 141/5653: Ministry of Defence minute of a meeting held at Government
House, December 1, 1958.
233. TNA FCO 141/5653: directive from permanent secretary to the District Ofﬁcer i/c
Settlement Camps, Hola, D.A. Marsden.
234. TNA FCO 141/5662: The medical register at the hospital recorded that Mutai Theuri,
Mbuthia Thairu, Ndeqwa Gacheo, and Mwema Kinuthia were: “Beaten by squad for refus-
ing duty.” This incident occurred toward the end of August 1958.
235. TNA FCO 141/5658: “Discipline – Hola Closed Camp,” letter from J.H. Lewis,
Commissioner of Prisons to Ofﬁcer in Charge at Hola, February 5, 1959.
236. TNA FCO 141/5658: situation report from Hola camp to the commissioner of pri-
sons, February 13, 1959.
Law and History Review, Month 201538
1555
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564
1565
1566
1567
1568
1569
1570
1571
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1577
1578
1579
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1585
1586
1587
1588
1589
1590
1591
1592
1593
1594
1595
1596
was the preferred solution for dealing with the “go-slow” policy, but ensur-
ing “absolute obedience from the 66 recalcitrant” detainees refusing to
work required a more sophisticated strategy.237 On the selected day “difﬁ-
cult cases” were to be divided into four smaller groups, and each group was
to be locked into an A-frame building. A special platoon was to target the
ﬁrst group, enter their compound, and usher them into the catwalk, at
which point the ofﬁcer-in-charge would order the detainees to work on a
labor scheme “requiring no tools or implements. . . it is assumed that the
party would obey this order but should they refuse they would be man-
handled to the site of work and forced to carry out the task.”238 Each
group in turn would be removed “until all were working,”239 and Cowan
insisted that “obedience must be maintained by more ﬁrmness on the
part of the staff,” but that this did not “imply a brutal and harsh regime
but a high standard of personal example and insistence always on immedi-
ate obedience.”240 Not everyone supported Cowan’s plan, and less than a
week later, the commissioner of prisons wrote to the Kenyan minister of
defence, warning that the plan “would mean the use of a certain degree
of force in which operation someone might get hurt, or even killed.”241
The Hola Massacre
Despite the warnings, on March 3, 1959, a group of “hard-core” detainees
who persistently refused to work were savagely beaten by warders imple-
menting the Cowan plan at Hola detention camp. Eleven detainees were
killed, and dozens more were hospitalized with severe injuries.242 A coro-
ner’s inquest revealed some of the injuries sustained, such as, “one re-
ceived a fractured skull. . . another’s brains were damaged, one had a
fractured jaw and two had fractured forearms.”243 The ﬁrst ofﬁcial account
to emerge can be seen as a complete whitewash. W.MQ3 . Campbell, Assistant
Commissioner of the Prison Service, reported that it was “the opinion of all
with whom we spoke that the compelling exercise was in no way
237. TNA FCO 141/5658: notably, the work scheme manager, Mr. Filgate, “asked to be
dissociated entirely” from Cowan’s plan; situation report from Hola camp to the commis-
sioner of prisons, February 13, 1959.
238. TNA FCO 141/5658: “The Cowan Plan,” February 11, 1959.
239. Ibid.
240. Ibid.
241. TNA FCO 141/5658: note from Lewis, Commissioner of Prisons, to the minister of
defence, February 17, 1959.
242. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 347.
243. TNA CABQ24 129/97 C92: memorandum from the colonial secretary to the Cabinet,
June 2, 1959, para. 13.
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connected with the cause of death of the detainees,”244 and the government
issued a press statement claiming that “the deaths occurred after [the de-
tainees] had drunk water from a water cart.”245 When W.HQ3 . Goudie, the
inquest magistrate, revealed that the deaths “were due to shock and hae-
morrhage due to multiple bruising caused by violence,” the ofﬁcial press
release was exposed as false.246
Despite the gravity of the case, the magistrate was unable to identify
those responsible, and he expressed the view that some of the violence di-
rected at the detainees was justiﬁable and lawful.247 In deciding not to
prosecute, the attorney-general relied on similar arguments, citing numer-
ous ordinances and standing orders that permitted the use of force against
detainees in limited circumstances.248 He argued that unlawful violence
could not be established in this case because of the lack of reliable evidence
and the failure of witnesses to cooperate with the CID investigation. Blame
shifted to the survivors, who were categorized as uncooperative and unreli-
able, and whose testimony was regarded as “valueless.”249 Unsurprisingly,
the investigation stalled and the European ofﬁcers and African subwardens
avoided criminal prosecution.
A disciplinary commission, the Conroy Committee, was subsequently
established, and it reported that the governor was concerned that “a further
formal enquiry might have damaging effects on the morale of the Kenya
Prison Service,” and advised that no further judicial action was needed.250
The only resulting “sanction” was that the Camp Commandant, G.MQ3 .
Sullivan, was forced to retire without any loss of gratuity, and the
Commissioner of Prisoners, John Lewis, was forced to retire 6 months
early, whereas Walter Coutts, Sullivan’s deputy, was absolved of any
244. TNA CAB 128/33/CC32: Cabinet minutes, June 20, 1959.
245. KNA, M SSQ25 , 115/51: press ofﬁce, handout number 142, “Death of 10 Detainees at
Hola,” March 4, 1959.
246. TNA CAB 129/97 C92: memorandum from the colonial secretary to the Cabinet,
June 2, 1959, para. 15.
247. Ibid., para. 14.
248. “Section 18 of the Prisons Ordinance authorises the use of weapons, where neces-
sary, by prison ofﬁcers against detainees escaping or attempting to escape, engaged in a
combined outbreak or using violence to any prison ofﬁcer or other person. Prison
Standing Orders forbid the striking by prison ofﬁcers of persons in custody save to the extent
necessary in defence or to overcome violence or resistance to escort. The Emergency
(Detained Persons) Regulations, 1954, prescribe the circumstances and manner in which cor-
poral punishment may be applied to detainees for offences against discipline,” Secret mem-
orandum detailing the attorney-general’s reasons for deciding not to prosecute, TNA CAB
129/97 C92, annex I, para. 9.
249. Secret memorandum detailing the attorney-general’s reasons for deciding not to
prosecute, TNA CAB 129/97 C92, annex I.
250. TNA CAB 128/33/CC32.
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wrongdoing in the matter.251 Several British MPs argued that responsibility
for the events lay with those ranked above Sullivan and Coutts, with the
government of Kenya, with Governor Baring, and, ultimately, with the sec-
retary of state for the colonies. The failure of the inquiry to “pin down re-
sponsibility all along the chain of command” was criticized by Ronald
Robinson, MP, who believed that it was a breach of ministerial responsi-
bility to permit junior ofﬁcers to shoulder the blame for this atrocity.252
Criminal charges were not pursued, he argued, because “quite instinctively,
sincerely and genuinely, without even being aware of it, hon. Members op-
posite do not believe that an African life is as important as a white man’s
life.”253 This sentiment was echoed by the Conservative MP Enoch Powell,
who departed from the Tory party line, and criticized the idea of African
standards for Africa or lower standards of justice than those applicable
in Britain. Powell argued that it was inappropriate to “pick and choose
where and in what parts of the world we shall use this or that kind of stand-
ard. . . We must be consistent with ourselves everywhere. All Government,
all inﬂuence of man upon man, rests upon opinion. What we can do in
Africa, where we still govern and where we no longer govern, depends
upon the opinion which is entertained of the way in which this country
acts and the way in which Englishmen act. We cannot, we dare not, in
Africa of all places, fall below our own highest standards in the acceptance
of responsibility.”254 Finally, Barbara Castle, a great advocate of detainees’
rights in Kenya, recognized that to accept the government’s recommenda-
tions would result in “one of the gravest miscarriages of justice in British
colonial history.”255 In the end, the opposition made a tactical error when it
failed to submit a motion on the question of holding an independent inqui-
ry into the massacre, and, therefore, no vote was taken after the debate,
which allowed the government to evade accountability.256 Although an in-
ternal review (the Fairn Commission) was established to investigate the
procedures along the pipeline, similar to the Glenday Inquiry, it had no
mandate to investigate past incidents, but could only make prospective
recommendations.257
251. Walter Coutts was a district commissioner and deputy to Sullivan, the Camp
Commandant. Hansard, House of Commons, vol. 610, col. 181, July 27, 1959.
252. Ibid., col. 216.
253. Ibid., col. 220.
254. Ibid., col. 237.
255. Ibid., col. 222.
256. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 353.
257. Ibid., 349. See also, Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 182.
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Accountability for Abuses
Recently, in the Mutua and Others case, the FCO claimed that security
force indiscipline and allegations of ill-treatment during the emergency
had already been investigated.258 There were no outstanding issues with re-
spect to state-sponsored violence in British Kenya, so the government ar-
gued, when providing the court with a list of historic prosecutions. In
March 1954, Colonel Arthur Young, on secondment from the city of
London, was instated as police commissioner of Kenya to tackle the culture
of impunity. Young, together with Donald MacPherson, head of the CID,
attempted to prise open a space for CID inquiries into abuses committed by
the police, the army, and the Kenyan Home Guard.259 The ﬁrst of these
cases, the Wamai case, which Young and MacPherson prosecuted, is
worth examining in more detail because it points to executive interference
in what should have been a matter for the judiciary.
Contemporary Accountability
The case against Muriu Wamai, a Home Guard headman, and his ﬁve co-
defendants, stemmed from the deaths of two Kikuyu farmers who were
beaten and tortured at the Ruthagathi Home Post. The two Kikuyu refused
to confess Mau Mau allegiance and were taken outside the town and exe-
cuted.260 Initially, Wamai claimed that their deaths occurred as a result of a
shootout between Home Guards and Mau Mau insurgents, although evi-
dence given by former detainees indicated that detainees were routinely
beaten at the Home Guard post. The European ofﬁcers compelled to
give evidence supported Wamai’s account of events.261 However, on the
3rd day in the witness stand, Wamai dramatically changed his plea and
gave a full confession.262 The British ofﬁcers were well aware that the
Home Guard post was a “screening center” where torture was institution-
alized, and Wamai had been encouraged to cover up the incident by a
British District Ofﬁcer.263 Alterations to the Home Guard post logbook
concerning the prisoners were made after the killings. Wamai’s confession
258. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], witness
statement of David Anderson.
259. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 298–99; Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 276.
260. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 298.
261. Ibid., 301.
262. Ibid., 302.
263. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], appendix
C, para. (i).
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implicated ﬁve British ofﬁcers and an African chief in the subsequent
conspiracy.264
Issuing his judgement on December 4, 1954, Justice Cram found Wamai
and his codefendants guilty of murder and the judge, a former prisoner of
war, was vitriolic about the conduct of European ofﬁcers in the South
Nyeri district.265 Unchecked arbitrary powers contributed to a barbaric
detention and interrogation system that Justice Cram declared was ille-
gal.266 Contrary to the ofﬁcials’ claim that the allegations of murder
were part of a Mau Mau plot to discredit loyalist Home Guards, Cram
found “the only plots revealed by their evidence [the European ofﬁcers]
is a plot to execute innocent prisoners, and then a plot to defeat the ends
of justice, and maintain the barbarous tortures of Ruthagathi. . . They
were a prey [sic] on the countryside. . .”267 Justice Cram recognized that
it was a short step from brutalized beatings and torture to “taking life with-
out qualm.”268 Governor Baring attempted to suppress publication of
the judgment; however, copies were leaked, causing quite a stir in the
United Kingdom.269 An inquiry resulted, presided over by a conservative
judge, Justice Holmes, who concluded that Justice Cram had “grossly ex-
aggerated the problems.”270 Many were dissatisﬁed with the Holmes re-
port, including the president of the East African Court of Appeal, who
wrote to Governor Baring to request that the ﬁrst section of the report,
which gave the impression that outstanding issues from the Wamai case
had been settled, be withheld.271 The governor agreed to this proposal,
which, according to Anderson, was a “tacit admission that the matters
raised by Justice Cram in his judgment in the Ruthagathi case had not in
fact been properly investigated by the Kenya administration, despite the
establishment of a full judicial inquiry.”272
At every level, the CID experienced obstruction in their attempts to further
criminal prosecutions against colonial staff.273 The colonial government’s
264. Two European ofﬁcers committed perjury and one gave a false statement to the
court, Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 303.
265. Criminal Case No. 240 of 1954 of HM Supreme Court of Kenya at Nyeri.
266. Ibid., 8.
267. Ibid.
268. Ibid.
269. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], appendix
C, para (i).
270. Anderson, “Histories of the Hanged,” 306.
271. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], witness
statement of David Anderson, s. 16.
272. Ibid.
273. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], appendix
C, para (j).
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approach was to maintain the detention pipeline and security force morale,
even at the expense of justice in individual cases.274 Colonel Young sent
Governor Baring a series of communications between November and
December 1954, highlighting the difﬁculties he was encountering, but this
correspondence was unacknowledged, and in his frustration he resigned
his post pointing to “the continuance of the rule of fear rather than that of
impartial justice.”275 At the center of his predicament were “malpractices
committed against Mau Mau suspects” that were “condoned by ofﬁcers of
the Provincial Administration,” and in his resignation letter, which he sub-
mitted to Governor Baring, Young stated that the governor himself had at-
tempted to interfere in the prosecution of one of these cases.276 Young’s
letter was not made public and he was forced to tone down the language con-
tained therein. Later, Young recalled how he had sent “an ofﬁcial report to
HE [His Excellency] expressing my apprehensions in writing, with the belief
that supporting evidence would soon be forthcoming. I also requested that he
should take an initiative in administration of action which would indicate his
own repugnance of brutality committed by security forces and do what he
could to bring this to an end. I received no acknowledgement of this appre-
ciation, far less an answer to it, in spite of a number of reminders.”277 On
January 18, 1955, the government announced a general amnesty for all vio-
lent actions committed by both the security forces and “Mau Mau surren-
derers” up until that point.278 On paper, the amnesty was accessible to
insurgents, however, to avail themselves of it, the rebels had to emerge
from hiding and surrender their arms. Overall, it had the effect of preventing
CID investigations into security force malpractices from coming to trial.279
The amnesty perpetuated the lack of security force accountability, and, ac-
cording to Elkins, “the blanket pardon left little doubt that the colonial gov-
ernment, including Churchill and his cabinet, who discussed and approved
the amnesty, were wholly willing to abandon the enforcement of law and
order and to subordinate the basic human rights of Mau Mau adherents in
order to maintain the support of the security forces and, ultimately, uphold
British colonial rule in Kenya.”280 Today, blanket amnesties are inimicable
274. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 300.
275. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], appendix
C, para (j).
276. This case was the attempted prosecution of Home Guard Chief Mundia, Klose,
Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 179–80.
277. RH, Mss. Afr. s. 486, Sir Arthur Young, papers, box 5, ﬁle 1, Arthur Young,
“Introduction to Sir Arthur Young,” n.d., 14.
278. Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau, 27.
279. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 308.
280. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 280.
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to international law principles, such as the duty to prosecute and punish
gross human rights violations and the fulﬁlment of a right to a remedy.281
However, at that time, acts of indemnity had historical precedent in
England, with the English jurist, Alfred Venn Dicey admitting that although
“it is the legalisation of illegally,” the statute is essentially law, and could
only be questioned if indemniﬁcation pertained to, for example, “reckless
cruelty to a political prisoner,” or “the execution of a political prisoner.”282
That said, there is a deep ambivalence in Dicey’s legal scholarship, whereby
his principles of nondiscrimination and equality before the law were largely
abandoned in his wholehearted support of Irish coercion laws.283 Therefore,
his exceptions to indemniﬁcation probably would not have stretched to co-
lonial violence and counterinsurgency.
Up until that point, there were several judgements at the East African
Court of Appeal that queried whether the unlawful violence of detention
could have continued “without the condonation [sic] of the authority.”284
Corruption was pervasive, and the appeals court protested against “the ill
treatment of captives.”285 Judicial recommendations for security force
prosecution were ignored, and the lack of consequences for criminal vio-
lence resulted in the police force of Kenya becoming “a law unto itself.”286
Convictions were few and far between, and punishment was often perfunc-
tory.287 A memorandum prepared by the colonial secretary defending the
administration’s response to security force violence referred to six cases,
none of which resulted in a custodial sentence for the European ofﬁcers
involved.288
281. Louise Mallinder, “Can Amnesties and International Justice Be Reconciled?” The
International Journal of Transitional Justice 1 (2007): 210, 213. Mallinder recommends
prosecuting the most guilty perpetrators of the worst atrocities, whereas conditional amnes-
ties for lower level offenders may be commensurate with international law, treaty, and
custom.
282. Alfred Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Liberty
Fund: Indianapolis, 1982), 145.
283. Alfred Venn Dicey, England’s Case Against Home Rule, 3rd ed. (London: John
Murray, 1887).
284. Criminal Appeals 988 and 989 of 1954 (from Emergency Assize Criminal Case No.
584 of 1954 of HM Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi), KNA: MLA 1/1098. See witness
statement of David Anderson for a list of relevant cases.
285. Criminal Appeal No.818 of 1954 of Criminal Case No.289 of 1954 (Nyeri).
286. Criminal Appeals 549, 550, 551, and 552 of 1954 (from Emergency Assize Criminal
Case No. 330 of 1954 of HM Supreme Court of Kenya at Nairobi) KNA: MLA 1/905.
287. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 310, 311; Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 278, 282–84.
288. A commandant of Mara River detention camp, L.W.Q3 Lemon, was charged of causing
actual bodily harm, but he was convicted of the lesser offence, common assault, and ﬁned
sh.500. Jasiel Njau, an African rehabilitation ofﬁcer in the Gathigiriri Works Camp, was ac-
quitted of murdering a detainee in January 1957, but convicted and sentenced to 12 months
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The foregoing discussion raises the question of whether the detention re-
gime instituted by the British government in the colony of Kenya was per-
missible under international law. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (1948) holds that “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of person,” whereas Article 5 provides that “No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.”289 Although the Declaration was not a legally binding
instrument,290 there was unanimity among the diverse member states in-
volved in legislating “on behalf of all peoples and all nations” regarding
the importance of human rights norms after the war.291 Colonized peoples
were not represented in these negotiations, although Third World activists,
according to Roland Burke, played a more signiﬁcant role in contributing
to the new human rights discourse after decolonization.292 Although there
was an assumption that the Declaration would apply to all colonies and de-
pendencies,293 “screening,” “dilution,” and the “Mwea procedure” as prac-
tised in detention facilities across Kenya were contrary to the spirit of the
Declaration.294 The emergency in Kenya began shortly after crimes against
humanity were ﬁrst prosecuted by the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, and international humanitarian law was already an established
body of law.295 Mau Mau insurgents would not have met the strict criteria
for “irregular forces” set out by customary humanitarian law, which would
imprisonment for manslaughter. The attorney-general decided not to prosecute the senior
European ofﬁcers associated with this case, although they were subject to disciplinary char-
ges. In October 1957, Mr C.R.Q3 Harrison and two of the European ofﬁcers were acquitted of
the charge of causing actual bodily harm, when using force to extract labor from detainees.
And ﬁnally, another case of the unlawful killing of a detainee during interrogation in the
Gathigiriri camp resulted in the acquittal of two African interrogators on murder charges,
with the imposition of a 3 year sentence for manslaughter, whereas the camp supervisor,
Mr D.D.Q3 Luies, who was absent from the camp at the time of the incident, only received
a reprimand. TNA CAB 129/97 C92.
289. There are several other interlocking articles (including articles 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12,
13, 19, and 20) that were contravened in Kenya during the emergency.
290. It may now have standing as part of customary international law.
291. Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of Human Rights, 1.
292. Ibid.
293. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the
European Convention (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 409.
294. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 319–321. See also: TNA CO 822/1251: “Dilution
Detention Camps,” and Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth
Ofﬁce [2011], appendix B.
295. For more on the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg and the codiﬁcation of
crimes against humanity, see chapter entitled: ““Unimaginable Atrocities”: Identifying
International Crimes,” in William Schabas, Unimaginable Atrocities: Justice, Politics, and
Rights at the War Crimes Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 25–46.
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have allowed them to beneﬁt from prisoner of war protections.296 Although
jurisdiction was lacking, humanitarian law offered states a powerful norma-
tive framework for upholding standards in the treatment of detainees and
prisoners, especially when considering that Nazi concentration camps
were liberated by British and American soldiers. These ideals, alongside
other obligations of international law that extended to the colony, should
have elicited moral abhorrence at what was occurring in the Kenyan
camps. However in the 1950s, Britain and other colonial states took a min-
imalistic approach to international law obligations vis-à-vis the rights of
their colonial subjects, and Klose regards the colonial response to demands
for national independence as a combination of measures incorporating rule
by emergency laws, an “emphasis on the new military doctrine of antisub-
versive warfare,” and the “refusal to recognize the validity of international
humanitarian law,” and that these factors underpinned “the unleashing of
colonial violence.”297
The United Kingdom government signed the 1930 ILO Forced Labour
Convention on June 3, 1931 and it was accepted into Kenya without mod-
iﬁcation. However, on February 17, 1954 the British Cabinet approved a
forced labor policy for the Kenyan detention camps in the following
terms “[. . .] the regulation authorising compulsory employment should
contain words to the effect that any person detained in a special detention
camp might be usefully employed in work which, in the opinion of the of-
ﬁcer in charge, would assist in bringing the Emergency to an end. He [the
Colonial Secretary] proposed to instruct the Governor to make the regula-
tion in this form. In these circumstances it would probably be unnecessary
to pay market rates of wages for work undertaken by prisoners in the deten-
tion camps.”298 Therefore, Regulation 22 of the Emergency (Detained
Persons) Ordinance was worded so as to bring it within the meaning of
the 2(2)(d) emergency clause.299 Notwithstanding these efforts, the ILO
Committee of Experts criticized the government’s use of forced labor in
Kenya
[t]he committee has noted that in response to the observation that was made
in 1956 the government declares that the forced or compulsory labour exacted
under the laws and regulations in force falls within the exception covered by
296. The Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12,
1949, which applied to conﬂict not of an international nature, was only extended to the col-
onies in 1959. Humanitarian law instruments applicable in the colony before that time were
the Hague Conventions and the Geneva Convention of 1929.
297. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 194, 234.
298. Ibid.
299. See note 197. TNA CO 822/1420: Regulation 22 denotes that the ofﬁcer in charge
should be satisﬁed that the work “will assist in bringing the Emergency to an end.”
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Article 2, paragraph 2(d) (cases of Emergency) and 2(e) (minor communal
services). With regard to the regulations relating to a state of Emergency
the committee considers that it may assume that the disappearance of the ex-
ceptional circumstances which justiﬁed the adoption of those regulations will
enable the government to apply the letter of the Convention as well as the
spirit.300
Descriptions of coerced labor depicted in detainees’ testimonies are entire-
ly at odds with the idea of purposeful work contributing to the end of con-
ﬂict. Some of the tasks were manifestly designed to be cruel or punitive, as
one detainee reported “[. . .] at Takwu Detention Camp detainees are work-
ing in sea-water, breaking stones along a canal for a continuous period of
four hours, clearing mangrove forest trees in water and road making
through where canal surface was to be broken with picks. . . We consider
that removing of sanitary buckets for the Ofﬁcer in charge and warders
is purely punitive.”301 These testimonies suggest there was a violation of
the ILO Forced Labour Convention 1930 when the labor exacted did not
fall under the treaty’s emergency clause, and in instances in which the
forced labor policy continued after the emergency ofﬁcially ended.
Could there have been an actionable tort arising from the use of forced la-
bour in the Kenyan camps? Although there may have been a violation of
the 1930 Forced Labour Convention, ultimately, allegations of unlawful
killing and torture are much more compelling, with the latter forming
the backbone of the Mutua and Others claim.
Retrospective Accountability
The claimants in Mutua and Others submitted an action to the United
Kingdom High Court for alleged torts of “assault and battery, and negli-
gence.”302 Civil actions of the sort rely on a balance of probabilities test.
As highlighted in Justice McCombe’s summary of the 2011 judgment,303
the relevant tort law pertaining to the case is the 1980 Limitations Act, and
through Article 33 of that Act, judicial discretion may extend the usual 3
year limitation clause for personal damages. Public interest may be a factor
in issuing judicial discretion, and in the instant case, the state’s duty was to
investigate allegations of torture. At the same time, claimants needed to
300. Ibid.
301. TNA CO 822/402: petition detailing conditions in the camps and presented to Dingle
Foot MP upon his inspection of various camps in September 1956.
302. Negligence being a common law duty to intervene or stop systematic abuses once
that became known, see Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth
Ofﬁce, 21/07/2011, Summary of Judgment.
303. Ibid.
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have a reasonable chance of success, to outweigh the huge costs associated
with historic actions. Surviving historical documentation may illuminate
the “aims and purposes” that the British government had in relation to
the colonial emergency, which could establish responsibility for torts. A
factor that could inﬂuence judicial discretion in waiving the limitation is
evidence that the United Kingdom government and the colonial adminis-
tration had inhibited investigations into camp abuses and restricted the
remit of contemporary inquiries.304 However, no action in tort may be
brought for wrongs that occurred prior to June 23, 1954.305 Claims arising
from other colonies would need to furnish a United Kingdom court with
compelling reasons for a prolonged delay in submitting such a claim. It
is notable that in the Kenyan case, the Mau Mau organization was pro-
scribed until 2002–2003, and many of the elderly survivors of abuse resid-
ed in remote and rural areas.
Justice McCombe had to decide whether the claimants had a “viable
claim in law,” and if they had any realistic chances of success with their
claim.306 As defendants, the FCO argued that acts committed by the colo-
nial government essentially were not acts of the United Kingdom govern-
ment, and that legal liability for these acts passed to the successor state at
independence. This was unchartered legal territory, as counsel for the
claimants explained, “Neither the Kenya Independence Act 1963, nor
any other UK statute or instrument, addresses the question of the succes-
sion of liabilities of the Colonial Administration for assaults against the
Claimants.”307 In such a case, the matter must be decided at common
law, but common law has to incorporate international customary law into
its decision making. Following consideration of arguments, including the
claimants’ reliance on postcolonial Algerian jurisprudence against
France, and the defense drawing from the QuarkQ9 case, Justice McCombe
decided that the liabilities of the old colonial regime did not transfer to
the United Kingdom at Kenyan independence in 1963. However, under
the principle of “joint liability for torts,” the United Kingdom government,
named as a joint tortfeasor, could still have a case to answer for historic
wrongs committed by the army or the Colonial Ofﬁce, and such matters
were ﬁt for trial.308 Justice McCombe further examined General
304. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2012], para.
140.
305. Ibid., para. 38, citing Arnold v CEGB [1988] AC 228 and McDonnell v
Congregation of Christian Brothers and others [2004] 1 AC 1101.
306. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce, Summary of
Judgment, para. 2.
307. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 81(a).
308. Ibid., para. 116.
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Erskine’s role in the emergency and he concluded that there was sufﬁcient
documentary evidence to suggest Erskine’s involvement in the detention
system, and that, therefore, the issue was triable. He made similar conclu-
sions in respect of the colonial secretary and the Colonial Ofﬁce, “[a]ll
these matters are, in my judgment, properly triable issues on the evidence be-
fore me, including the evidence of the continuing and still incomplete disclo-
sure by the defendant of previously unseen materials. The evidence shows
that those new materials were removed from Kenya upon independence pre-
cisely because of their potential to embarrass the UK Government.”309
A signiﬁcant point of dispute between the parties pertained to the role
played by the United Kingdom government in the development and control
of the detention camps. Both the Kenyan colonial government and the
United Kingdom government were very much aware of the “extent of con-
tinuing misconduct in the treatment of detainees,” and by not making any
concerted efforts to stop the abuses, the United Kingdom government ne-
glected their duty of care and could have been found guilty of negligence.
However, the role of the United Kingdom government may have gone be-
yond simple negligence through acts of omission, and if the facts of the
case presented by the Mutua claimants could be established, it suggested
to Justice McCombe “the distinct possibility of an active direction of policy
and an active part in its implementation on the part of Her Majesty’s
Government” which could only be clariﬁed if the matter went to trial.
Given the gravity of the matters being considered, Justice McCombe crit-
icized the United Kingdom government for relying on technical constitu-
tional legal theory so early in the proceedings (in an effort to get the
case struck out), in a way the judge described as “dishonourable.”310
The British Prime Minister, Sir Harold Wilson, ﬁrst accepted the option-
al clauses to the European Convention (pertaining to individual petitions
and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court) in 1966 for an initial 3
year period.311 At the time, it was considered that acceptance would
apply only to prospective cases, which was a response to litigation taken
by the Burmah Oil Company against the United Kingdom government
for the destruction of its oil reﬁneries in 1942. Lord Lester’sQ3 examination
of the period leading up to acceptance tellingly reveals little or no discus-
sion of the possibility of colonial legacy issues.312 In this event, a temporal
309. Ibid., para. 130.
310. Ibid., para. 154.
311. Ed Bates, The Evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights: From its
Inception to the Creation of a Permanent Court of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 185.
312. Lord Lester of Herne Hill, “UK Acceptance of the Strasbourg Jurisdiction: What
Really Went on in Whitehall in 1965,” Public LawQ26 (1998): 237.
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limitation was incorporated, “into the U.K.’s declaration of acceptance a
limitation making it clear that acceptance applied only to matters arising
after its effective date, thereby excluding a once-and-for-all action of the
kind taken in connection with the Burmah Oil claims, occurring before
that date.”313 This declaration effectively annulled approximately eighty
applications that had been received by the Commission in anticipation of
Britain’s acceptance of the optional clauses, but equally, the declaration
“did not extend to petitions relating to matters arising in any dependent ter-
ritory, or to anything done or occurring in the United Kingdom in respect
of any such territory or of any matters arising there.”314 The 2014
“Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria,” produced by the European
Court of Human Rights, notes that when countries have drafted declara-
tions with temporal limitations, “the Commission and the Court have
accepted temporal limitations of their jurisdiction with respect to facts fall-
ing within the period between the entry into force of the Convention and
the relevant declaration.”315 However, the evolving jurisprudence of the
Court has provided for exceptions to the test criteria on admissibility per
ratione temporis,316 and such consideration can occur when the right to
life (Article 2) is violated or breaches of the prohibition on torture
(Article 3) are alleged. It is signiﬁcant that the Court in Silih v Slovenia
elaborated the concept of procedural detachability applying to the right
to life. In essence, this means that the state’s investigation into a death
may be examined by the Court even if the substance of the claim occurred
prior to the Court assuming jurisdiction in that member state’s territory.
The criteria outlined in Silih v Slovenia are not unlimited, and must be
in accordance with the principle of legal certainty:
162. First, it is clear that, where the death occurred before the critical date
[entry into force of the Convention], only procedural acts and/or omissions
occurring after that date can fall within the Court’s temporal jurisdiction.
163. Second, there must exist a genuine connection between the death and the
entry into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State for the
procedural obligations imposed by Article 2 to come into effect.
Thus a signiﬁcant proportion of the procedural steps required by this provi-
sion—which include not only an effective investigation into the death of the
person concerned but also the institution of appropriate proceedings for the
purpose of determining the cause of the death and holding those responsible
313. Ibid., 252.
314. Ibid., 253.
315. European Court of Human Rights, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, 47,
para. 199.
316. This test criteria is set out in Blečić v. Croatia, (Application no. 59532/00), March 8,
2006, para. 67.
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to account. . .—will have been or ought to have been carried out after the crit-
ical date.
However, the Court would not exclude that in certain circumstances the con-
nection could also be based on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the
underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective
manner.317
Of these, perhaps the latter Convention values test is most signiﬁcant to the
current discussion, but it is also notable that the detachability principle has
been invoked by the Court to examine investigations into torture and ill-
treatment, where, in the main, proceedings occurred after the entry into
force of the Convention, whereas the actual violation preceded that critical
date.318 Therefore, although the United Kingdom only accepted individual
petition mechanism in 1966, applicants to Europe could argue that they
were prevented from accessing a remedy for these most serious violations,
not merely because of the temporal limitation on the state’s declaration,
but because of historic, structural, and evidentiary legal obstacles, and
that fresh evidence coming into the public domain via the Hanslope
Disclosure cast a new light on the circumstances of historic violations.319
Claimants in the Mutua and Others case argued that the coming into being
of the Human Rights Act, and the unearthing of voluminous documenta-
tion in 2005 and 2011, triggered a duty upon the state to investigate alle-
gations of torture, and that the procedural obligation attached to this article
was “revived.”320
Another possibility would be to argue the Convention values test, as a
short period in between the violation and the entry into force of the
Court’s jurisdiction was established in the Silih judgment.321 The Court
may depart from this rule and permit a “further extension of the Court’s
jurisdiction into the past. . . if the triggering event has a larger dimension
which amounts to a negation of the very foundations of the Convention
(such as in cases of serious crimes under international law), but only
to events which occurred after the adoption of the Convention, on 4
November 1950.”322 Torture was “institutionalised and systematic, but
317. Silih v. Slovenia, (Application no. 71463/01), April 9, 2009, paras. 161–63.
318. Yatsenko v Ukraine, (Application no. 75345/01), February 16, 2012, para. 40;
Lyubov Eﬁmenko v. Ukraine, (Application no. 75726/01), November 25, 2010, para. 63.
319. Janowiec and Others v Russia, (Applications nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09), April
16, 2012, para. 139.
320. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2012], paras.
142, 147.
321. The Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria states “not exceeding ten years,” para
212.
322. Ibid., 214.
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also casual and haphazard” during the emergency in Kenya.323 Practices
associated with “screening” or the interrogation of Mau Mau suspects in-
cluded whipping, beatings, use of electric shock, administering cigarette
burns, Chinese water treatment, sexual violence, and sterilization.324 The
claimants in Mutua and Others experienced “physical mistreatment of
the most serious kind, including torture, rape, castration and severe beat-
ings” while in detention.325 In this light, the scale of the abuses that oc-
curred within a network of extrajudicial camps established not 10 years
after the liberation of Nazi concentration camps might be considered a ne-
gation of the very values enshrined in the European Convention that encap-
sulated a postwar abhorrence of violence and human degradation.
Conclusion
This article examines the legal regime that facilitated the detention without
trial of somewhere between 80,000 and 150,000 people during the Kenyan
emergency. Abuses that occurred in the detention camp network were
highlighted through a thematic study. In general terms, detention laws
and ordinances appear far removed from the environment that facilitated
torture, mistreatment, starvation, and forced labor. However, as Samera
Esmeir points out, a condition of rightlessness does not necessarily mean
“expulsion from the law.”326 The emergency regulatory framework in
Kenya facilitated the “lawful” conﬁnement of Kikuyu subjects, and the
bare violence of the system was translated into a language of euphemism,
through the invention of nomenclature such as “dilution,” “screening,” and
“the Mwea procedure.” These techniques occurred in camps that represent-
ed the “spatialization of the colonial state of emergency,”327 and this archi-
tecture dehumanized detainee suspects, and it is, therefore, essential for the
essential humanity of those affected to be ﬁnally recognized. It is doubtful
whether William Hague’s “apology” achieves this “[o]n behalf of Her
Majesty’s Government, that we understand the pain and grievance felt
by those who were involved in the events of the Emergency in Kenya.
The British Government recognises that Kenyans were subject to torture
and other forms of ill treatment at the hands of the colonial administration.
The British government sincerely regrets that these abuses took place, and
323. Elkins, Imperial Reckoning, 293.
324. Anderson, Histories of the Hanged, 65–68; 208–209.
325. Ndiku Mutua and Others v The Foreign and Commonwealth Ofﬁce [2011], para. 1.
326. Esmeir, Juridical Humanity, 93.
327. Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial Violence, 236.
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that they marred Kenya’s progress towards independence.”328 It is submit-
ted that this “recognition” falls short of fully accepting responsibility for
colonial era abuses in Kenya, especially as a foregoing paragraph alludes
to Mau Mau “guilt” for 2,000 emergency-related deaths, whereas no com-
parable ﬁgure is given for state-sponsored killings, “[d]uring the
Emergency Period widespread violence was committed by both sides,
and most of the victims were Kenyan. Many thousands of Mau Mau mem-
bers were killed, while the Mau Mau themselves were responsible for the
deaths of over 2,000 people including 200 casualties among the British
regiments and police.”329 Violence was used to elicit intelligence and en-
force compliance with detention regimes in other colonies.330 It is submit-
ted, however, that the pernicious fusing of a “civilizing mission” with
counterinsurgency strategy underpinned by a racist ideology resulted in
deadly violence against detainees in the Kenyan camps. This unholy con-
vergence demands a reassessment of the historical narrative regarding the
“defeat” of the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya.
Moreover, the article clearly argues that a culture of whitewash and de-
nial framed the manner in which colonial ofﬁcials in Kenya and London
responded to allegations of detention-based violence and abuses that
surfaced, which was certainly not unique to the colony of Kenya.
Government ministers, such as the colonial secretary, endorsed a quasilegal
regulatory framework that resulted in violence; however, to keep the vio-
lence hidden, a discourse constructed around the “rehabilitative” nature
of detention camps was publicly narrated, further constricting the space
for detainees to access justice. The Hanslope ﬁles, read alongside other de-
classiﬁed documents, reveal a general trend toward concealing detention-
based violence at local, colonial, and metropolitan levels, depending
upon the exigencies of the situation. The overarching framework of con-
cealment, was, at times, punctuated by acknowledgement of these acts
when irrefutable evidence entered the public domain (as was the case
with the Hola Massacre). The article highlights how unresolved or unac-
knowledged detention-based violence, torture, or mistreatment, even for
events that occurred many decades ago, may have contemporary salience.
328. Hague, “Statement to Parliament on settlement of Mau Mau claims.”
329. Ibid.
330. French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency. See also Klose, Human Rights in
the Shadow of Colonial Violence.
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